Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal
Income Taxation
Walter J. Blum

Under our federal income tax many of the substantive rules for
classifying actions have long appeared to call for an inquiry into somebody's state of mind.1 Associated with these rules are the terms motive,
intent, and purpose, which are by now old standbys in taxation. But
despite our extensive and varied experiences with these concepts,
several recent manifestations of confusion and discontent over their use
in tax rules have appeared. The tax administrators are unhappy with
the "primary purpose" test for determining when the cost of education
is deductible as a business expense, and have proposed to substitute in
the regulations a radically different type of standard. 2 A thoughtful
commentator has written that in ascertaining when the transportation
costs of a combined business-pleasure trip are deductible as business
expenses, the "primary purpose" test is inferior to a formula approach
that would allocate such costs between time actually spent in pursuit
of business and time given over to pleasure on the trip.3 The United
States Supreme Court, despite strong urgings on behalf of the tax
administrators, has refused to substitute motive for intent in stating
the test for delineating tax-free gifts from taxable payments of a business nature, saying: "We must confess to some skepticism as to whether
such a verbal mutation would be of any practical consequence." '4 And
a court of appeals last year added its gloss to state of mind in taxation
by noting that "The word purpose carries with it not only the taxpayer's
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1 "It is dear that something which lawyers call state of mind, the very existence of
which is denied by many respectable psychologists, is regarded as an integral part of the
law." Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations On the Law of Evidence-State of Mind
to Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283, 291 (1929).
2 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, 31 Fed. Reg. 12843 (1966).
3 Klein, Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and
Pleasure Trip--A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. Rlv. 1099 (1966).
4 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960).
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intent, but also his motive for entering into the transaction." 5 With
these selections as rough indicators of what may lie ahead on the tax
scene, a broad exploratory look at the role of state of mind in tax rules
seems to be timely."
I

The classic analysis of motive, intent, and purpose in criminal law
provides a useful point of departure.7 In the traditional classroom case
we are told that the defendant aimed a pistol at a person he wished to
hit with a bullet; that he pulled the trigger; and that the bullet hit a
bystander who was in the line of fire, while the man marked as the
target went unharmed. It might be possible in this situation to distinguish three aspects of the defendant's state of mind. We might ask
5 Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932, 936 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
6 This piece is concerned with substantive rules of tax law and not with rules
prescribing penalties for failure to comply with obligations imposed on taxpayers. It
obviously does not deal with many of the substantive areas of tax law in which motive,
intent, or purpose is relevant. The choice of illustrations was dictated not by their
practical importance, but by their potential for contributing to the overall analysis.
Sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 that might appear to refer to state of
mind include the following: § 214(a) ("the purpose"); § 269(a) ("the principal purpose');
§ 306(b)(4) ("one of its principal purposes'); § 341(b)(1) ("with a view to"); § 355(a)(1)(D)
(ii) ("one of its principal purposes'); § 357(b)(1) ('the principal purpose" and "not a bona
fide business purpose'); § 367 ("one of its principal purposes'); § 532 ("the purpose');
§ 552(b) ("the purpose"); § 704(b)(2) ("the principal purpose'); § 706(b) ('a business
purpose'); § 1101(d) ('one of the principal purposes'); § 1492(2) ("one of its principal
purposes'); § 1551 ("not a major purpose').
Sections of the Treasury Regulations that might appear to refer to state of mind include
the following: § 1.117-3(2) ('grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic considerations'); § 1.118-1 ("contributions . . . for the purpose of"); § 1.162-5 ("undertaken
primarily for the purpose of"); § 1.162-11 ("acquired for business purposes'); § 1.162-15(b)
("made with a reasonable expectation"); § 1.165-3(c)(2) ("with the intention of");
§ 1.212-1(b) ("with the expectation of'); § 1.212-1(c) ("carried on primarily as'); § 1.214l(a) ('for the purpose of"); § 1.274-2(c)(3)(i) ("expectation of deriving'); § 1.2745(b)(3)(iv) ("expected to be derived'); § 1.871-2(b) ('determined by his intentions');
§ 1.1237-1(a)(3) ("his intention").
7 The classic criminal law analysis is found in Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the
Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917). Cook distinguishes between the terms "intent" and
"intention": One intends the desired results or the necessary consequences of a deliberate
act; intention is the desire to bring about those results or consequences.
Wigmore commented that: "[TEhe important aspect of Intent [or design or plan] is
chiefly not an evidentiary one at all, but one of substantive law, as a state of mind
accompanying the act in question and necessary to its legal effect. Occasionally, to be
sure, Intent has an evidentiary significance, as where an intent at an earlier time is used
to indicate the continuance of the same intent at a later time, but here the evidentiary
use is to prove another mental state or condition, and not an act." 1 WIGMoRE, EvIDENcE
536 (3d ed. 1940).
The distinction between intent and intention does not seem useful in connection with
most of the matters discussed in the text. In the tax field the problem generally is not
proving the commission of an act. The major exception is where tax law accepts relationships determined under non-tax law, and proving the commission of an act is part of
establishing such relationships.
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what the defendant sought to accomplish in his act of pointing and
firing the gun-that is, what was his purpose? In the illustrative case,
his stated purpose was to hit the marked man. We might also inquire
whether the defendant desired to harm the victim-that is, what was
his intent? In the illustrative case the answer might depend on a
physical fact. If perforating the bystander was not absolutely necessary
in order to hit the marked man, there is no reason to conclude that the
defendant intended to harm the victim; but if the marked man could
not have been hit without perforation of the bystander, the defendant
must have intended to harm the victim. We might also inquire why
the defendant wanted to hit the marked man-that is, what was his
motive? In the classroom case the motive is not given, but we can
imagine as a possibility that the defendant thought the marked man
was about to shoot him and was trying to protect himself by shooting
first, or that the defendant had a grudge against the marked man be8
cause both were interested in the same woman.
Delineating these various aspects of state of mind is worthwhile only
if the distinctions make a difference in applying rules of law. In invoking criminal sanctions, we often do differentiate between the intentional and the accidental harming of a victim; and where harm is
intentionally inflicted, we often do distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable motives. Moreover, determining the purpose of the act
frequently can aid in establishing whether the harm was intended or
unintended and in fixing the actor's motive. Thus, in the classroom
case, the harm suffered by the victim probably would be regarded as
intended if the defendant's purpose in pulling the trigger was to hit
somebody who was standing immediately behind the victim, and that
harm probably would be regarded as accidental if the defendant was
trying to hit somebody standing beside the victim. Similarly, the finding as to motive might differ depending on whether the person the
defendant tried to hit was a rival suitor or a stranger brandishing a
gun. It is only because the substantive rules of criminal law at times
require focusing on these three different aspects of an actor's state of
mind that we try to maintain their separateness. 9
8 The experience of the criminal law with intent has been far from satisfactory:
"The Model Penal Code in its attempt to codify the concept of intent substitutes the
term 'purposely' which is defined as the equivalent of 'intentionally' or 'with intent.'
The purposive act, says the Model Code, must involve a material element of the offense
and it must be the actor's 'conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result.' . . . [I]f the material element involves 'attendant circumstances' the
act is purposive if the actor 'is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he
believes or hopes that they exist.' This is scarcely a clarification .... " Marshall, Relation
of the Unconscious to Intention, 52 VA. L. Rav. 1256, 1257-58 (1966).
9 In the field of tort law it sometimes is useful to distinguish between motive and
intent. Motive, in the sense of mental conditions in back of a desire to accomplish
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In turning to income tax law, the threshold question is whether a
parallel set of distinctions is required, or whether we can safely use
motive, intent, and purpose as loose synonyms without sacrificing
clarity.10 The threefold division seems capable of being superimposed
on situations involving tax consequences. Consider the case of a
Chicago-based taxpayer who flies to Miami in mid-winter, attends a
series of business meetings with business associates based in Miami,
then spends several days reading novels on the beach after learning that
a transportation strike prevents him from leaving Miami, and finally
flies home to Chicago at the end of the strike. In reviewing the taxpayer's state of mind pertaining to his trip, it could be said that his
purpose in going to Miami was to attend a business meeting, that in
going he did not intend to spend time relaxing on the beach, and that
his motive in meeting with his associates in Miami was not revealed
but conceivably could have been to advance his business career or to
get away from his wife for a few days. What is important, however, is
not whether such an analysis is possible, but whether it contributes to
the resolution of tax problems. Exploration of that question requires
analysis of particular tax rules.
The most promising area for analysis is the definition of "gift" under
the income tax provision excluding a gift from the recipient's gross
income. In the much discussed case of Commissioner v. Duberstein,"

one businessman made a present of a Cadillac to another businessman.
something, cannot be relevant in the case of an unintentional or negligent tort because
we cannot conceive of someone having reasons for doing that which he does not desire
to do. In many tort cases intent is relevant irrespective of the actor's motive, the question
being whether the actor sought to accomplish his act, even though he had no desire
to inflict injury. See Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891). In other situations,
such as actions interfering with economic relationships, motive is significant in that intentional conduct which would otherwise be actionable is non-actionable if undertaken for an
acceptable reason.
For two durable analyses of the role of intent and motive in tort law, see Ames, How
Faran Act May be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HRv.L. REv.
411 (1905); Terry, Intent to Defraud, 25 YALE L.J. 87 (1915). That role is much more
akin to the role of intent and motive in the criminal law than in tax law.
10 In the course of commenting upon the Supreme Court's handling of § 8(a)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act, Professor Bernard Meltzer observes: "Mhe Court
has indiscriminately used 'intent,' 'purpose,' and 'motive,' with resultant confusion."
Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 87, 93 n.23.
Tax consequences sometimes depend on whether the taxpayer acted in good faith in
not complying with some provision of the law. Such a rule fits somewhat uneasily under
the state of mind rubrics noted in the text. The good faith test asks whether the taxpayer
fell short because of an oversight, poor advice, or a willingness to gamble that his method
of handling things would not be discovered or controverted. The question then is of the
"why did he do it?" variety, and in this sense it can be assimilated within the loose
meanings usually attached to motive, intent, or purpose.
11 363 U.S. 278 (1960).

1967]

Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Taxation

The two men apparently knew each other personally and talked
together frequently over the telephone as they transacted business on
behalf of their respective companies. In the course of their conversations, the transferee of the auto from time to time provided the transferor with the names of potential customers for products handled by
the transferor's but not by the transferee's company. The tax question
was whether the recipient was to be treated as having received taxable
12
income or an excluded gift.
In presenting the issue to the Supreme Court, the government's brief
attempted to distinguish between intent and motive by giving the
terms their classical criminal law meaning: "Having decided to make
the payment, all the payor then 'intends' is to make the payment, and
if he thinks of it in his own mind as a 'gift' or as 'compensation,' he can
do so only by, wittingly or unwittingly, attributing to it his own legal
classification."'1 3 Since an intention to make the payment is consistent
with both a gift and a non-gift classification, the crucial state of mind
question, the government argued, must be whether personal feelings or
business considerations prompted the payment-and these are matters
that go to motive. The taxpayer argued that motive was irrelevant:
"A gift is a transfer of something of value 'for nothing,' "14 and the
only issue is the presence or absence of "donative intent"-an intent
that exists where the payor does not expect to receive anything of value
in return.
There is perhaps much to be learned from the facts that this clash of
positions did not produce any enlightening judicial discussion of
motive versus intent in taxation, and that in deciding the case the
Supreme Court by and large treated the two terms as inter-changeable.
The drawback in the government's position was that, while it called for
distinguishing between motive and intent, it left virtually no role for
the latter in the type of controversy under consideration. In the
criminal law a single case may raise both the question of whether harm
from deliberate conduct was accidental or intended, and the question
of what motivated the conduct. In the business gift situation, however,
everyone concedes that all consequences of the taxpayer's deliberate
conduct, other than the legal consequences, were intended and were
not accidental. On this account there appears to be no need to consider
intent as separate from motive.
But in these business gift cases do we not have to deal with intent
12 INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, § 102, excludes gifts from gross income.
13
14

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 13, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
Brief for the Respondents on Writ of Certiorari, p. 17, Commissioner v. Duberstein,

363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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in the form of "donative intent," a concept that seems to differ from
motive? Donative intent has played a major role under property law in
distinguishing gifts from other classes of transfers. Take, for example,
the situation in which a wealthy man transfers a bearer bond to his
sister and receives nothing of monetary value in return. If the sister
later asserts that she received a gift while the brother asserts that she
is merely holding the bond subject to his call, the key inquiry is likely
to focus on what the brother thought he was doing in making the
transfer: Did he think that he was giving up all his rights in the bond
and placing them unqualifiedly in his sister? Or did he think that he
was merely putting the bond in her hands for safekeeping until such
time as he requested its return?15 A version of this issue can arise in an
income tax context in that the determination of who is taxable on
interest yielded by the bond depends on whether there was a gift to the
sister or whether the bond continued to be owned by the brother. The
fact is that in determining legal relationships our tax law generally does
accept all relevant non-tax law concepts, including whatever state of
mind ingredients they contain, whenever no tax policy is impaired by
so doing.16 Under this policy the selection of the person to be charged
with income from the bond turns on state property law, and therefore
"donative intent" is bound to be central in settling the tax question.
The business gift type of case, however, is of a different nature. It
does not involve a disagreement between the transferor and transferee
over whether the transfer is a gift under state law; everyone, we can
assume, agrees that it is. The question presented is whether the income
tax is to have a different definition of gift to effectuate whatever is
thought to be the policy behind the exclusion of gifts from income.
And once it has been decided that a different definition is called fora step taken long ago-the concept of "donative intent" is no longer
salient in defining an excludable gift. The residual issue is under what
circumstances should a transfer that satisfies the "donative intent" test
be treated as being something other than a gift.17
15 See William Black, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1394 (1965).
16 Tax law tries to answer certain questions in the same way that private law would

answer them if they arose under private law. Consider a lease calling for a security
deposit to be applied to rent at the end of the term if no default occurs and containing
an option to purchase and apply the security deposit to the purchase price. Are the
payments in the form of the deposit to be classed as rents or purchase price? The Tax
Court in one case answered by saying: "[M1ere we think they were ... primarily intended
as rent, and that the applicability upon purchase price is so secondary as not to require
a different conclusion ....
[T"he option was the less important consideration.
Gilken Corp., 10 T.C. 445, 454-55 (1948).
17 It might be noted that in the course of defining a gift under the federal gift tax,
the Supreme Court had this to say: "Had Congress taxed 'gifts' simpliciter, it would
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Very likely we have here an explanation of why the government in
Duberstein stressed the distinction between motive and intent, even
though under its argument intent was not in dispute. When the central
issue is phrased in terms of intent, there is always the possibility that
the donative intent of the transferor will be viewed as a significant
pro-gift factor.' 8 By seeking to phrase the issue in terms of motive, the
government apparently hoped to neutralize the element of "donative
intent" and to concentrate attention on why the transferor made a
transfer with respect to which he neither received any payment nor
created nor discharged any legal obligation.
In the same vein, the government probably wished to nullify the
persuasiveness of any statement by the transferor that he intended to
make a gift. If the definition of gift is stated in terms of intent rather
than motive, it is easier to fall into the error of assuming that the
colloquial usage of gift comes within the technical tax definition of the
term. A transferor is not very likely to say that "my motive was to make
a gift"; and perhaps the oddity of speaking in this way would provide
an added warning that the definition of gift is itself in issue.
A more troublesome aspect of the government's position regarding
motive and intent in the definition of a gift was flagged by a point
made in the taxpayer's brief in Duberstein: "[I]f one man hated
another so much that he decided to give him $100,000, knowing that
he would drink himself to death, there would nevertheless be a gift....
[T]he motive would be one of hate. The same $100,000 gift could be
made by one friend to another and the motive would be for love or
friendship."'19 In effect, the taxpayer was arguing that the definition of
gift should be hinged to intent rather than to motive because motive
concerns emotions, and emotions have no place in classifying actions
under the income tax. This is a challenge that is not to be ignored.
be appropriate to assume that the term was used in its colloquial sense, and a search
for 'donative intent' would be indicated. But Congress intended to use the term 'gifts'
[for gift-tax purposes] in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. . . . Congress chose
not to require an ascertainment of what too often is an elusive state of mind. For
purposes of the gift tax it not only dispensed with the test of 'donative intent.' It
formulated a much more workable external test .... Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S.
303, 306 (1945).
18 The thrust of accepted usage with respect to motive and intent in gift situations
can be illustrated in a slightly different manner. Suppose that a transfer had all the
outward trappings of a gift in the colloquial sense and that the transferor made expressions
usually associated with gifts (again in the colloquial sense). Would it not be awkward to
conclude that the transferor did not intend to make a gift because his dominant reason
for benefiting the recipient was to reward him for past and hoped-for future business

favors?
19 Brief for the Respondents on Writ of Certiorari, p. 10, Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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The heart of the problem in business gift cases is that the transfers
take place in a mixed context of economic dealings and of friendship
or admiration between the parties. 20 In giving the present, the transferor may have had in mind the personal side of his relationship with
the transferee as well as past or possible future commercial aspects of
their association. The main definitional question ultimately comes
down to how large a degree of the commercial element is compatible
with a gift under the income tax exclusion. 21 In administering the
dichotomy between noncommercial and commercial thoughts, there is
no need to draw a distinction between hate and love and other emotions. A present to a friend with whom the giver has no economic
relations carries no commercial overtones, regardless of whether it is
motivated by love or hate; and a present to an employee very likely has
such overtones, regardless of which of these emotions the employer
may experience. Stated somewhat differently, the only relevant motives
are those that bear on the commercial-noncommercial dichotomy. This
viewpoint probably was implicit in the government's emphasis on
motive in Duberstein, and traces of it can be found in the efforts of the
Supreme Court to discuss the problem of defining a gift in terms of
intent rather than motive.
The taxpayer's point about love and hate might suggest that in
business gift cases we should consider not why the transferor wanted to
augment the recipient's wealth, but what he sought to accomplish in so
doing. That is, assigning these terms their classic criminal law meanings, we should shift attention from motive to purpose. It is hard to see
how such a change would improve handling of the problem. In the
criminal law, as noted, there sometimes is need to differentiate between
motive and purpose. To use a variation of the classic example, if it is
found that the defendant's purpose in firing the gun was to wound the
victim, our disposition of his case may depend on whether -his motive
was to eliminate a man he hated or to defend himself against an
immediate threat posed by someone with whom he was not even
20 For an illustration of the comparable problem in distinguishing between a charitable
gift and a payment to charity for past or anticipated benefits from the charitable organization, see Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C.
1965); Harold De Jung, 56 T.C. 896 (1961). Where a taxpayer pays a non-exempt organization to provide services or goods to an exempt organization, there is the analogous question whether the reason for the action was to benefit the exempt organization or to benefit
the non-exempt one. See Mozelle C. Kuss, 46 T.C. 572 (1966).
21 This states the definitional issue too narrowly for transfers outside the business area.
For example, a transfer to a complete stranger can be a gift, provided that, in the words
of the Supreme Court in Duberstein, it proceeds from "a detached and disinterested
generosity . . . out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." 363 U.S.
at 285.
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acquainted. But in applying the commercial-noncommercial dichotomy
in the gift cases, the state of mind search seems to deal with precisely
the same mental processes whether the issue is posed in terms of motive
or purpose. Can there be any difference between asking: What commercial and what noncommercial goals did the transferor seek to
accomplish? and asking: What emotions or thoughts connected with
such goals activated him? Both phrasings seem to advance us equally
far in determining the degree to which the transfer is to be explained
by commercial as compared to noncommercial considerations. It needs
only to be added that usage very likely stands against talking about
purpose in the gift area-perhaps because we usually do not concern
ourselves with what the donor seeks to accomplish in the case of the
typical gift that has no commercial implications. Although we could
view the ordinary donor in a noncommercial setting as seeking to
achieve personal satisfactions, we customarily tend to think of him as
giving up something rather than as pursuing a purpose.
This parallelism between motive and purpose in the business gift
area can be extended to include intent. So long as the inquiry is
directed at how much the transferor's conduct is to be explained by
commercial and how much by noncommercial reasons, it matters little
whether we refer to his motive or his intent or his purpose. 22 In all
probability, this was understood by the Supreme Court in Duberstein
when, in refusing to rephrase the gift criterion in terms of motive
rather than intent,23 it said: "We take it that the proper criterion...
22

Compare the analysis offered by Randolph Paul: "Much confusion in tax cases has

been caused by the fact that many courts and writers cheerfully use the terms 'intent'
and 'motive' as though the two words were exactly interchangeable in meaning ....
'Intent' may be used in at least three distinct legal meanings. It may designate simply
the exercise of will power necessary to cause muscular or physical movement. This concept
is, of course, irrelevant in the field of tax law. Secondly, it may denote the immediate
result desired by the actor. Thirdly, it may signify the ultimate reason for aiming at that
immediate objective. At this point, however, intent shades into motive, which is really the
ulterior intent or the cause of the intent. Intent, in other words, is the object of the act;
motive, in turn, is the object or spring of the intent. Using the terms in these senses,
intent is frequently material to tax questions; whereas motive-properly enough-is of
importance only in comparatively rare instances .... ." Paul, Motive and Intent in
Federal Tax Law, in SE.ECTED STms IN FEDERAL TAxATIoN 257-58 (2d ser. 1938).
A current comment on motive, intent, and purpose in the tax field is that: "The distinction between motive, intent, and purpose, although not entirely clear, is made less clear
by the failure of the Service and the courts to attempt to make such distinctions. In
general terms: purpose is what you intend to do (object); motive is why you do it; and
intent is the voluntariness behind the act by which you seek to accomplish your purpose.. " Eliasberg, What is Behind the Current IRS Attacks on Subsidiaries of Exempt
Organizations?26 J. TAxATION 234, 235 n.8 (1967).
23 Another possible explanation for the Supreme Court's refusal to substitute motive
for intent is that the Court was apprehensive that revenue officials might try to upset
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is one that inquires what the basic reason for his conduct was in factthe transfer.
the dominant reason that explains his action in making
24
go."
to
profitable
it
think
not
do
we
that
Further than
In general, these observations are also valid with respect to classifying
expenses as business or as personal, a problem illustrated by the fares
paid by the hypothetical Chicago-based businessman who travelled to
Miami and back. If the classification question is made to turn on
whether his reasons for taking the trip were business or personal in
nature, the issue can be posed with equal clarity in terms of motive,
intent, or purpose. More precise usage, however, is likely to advance
the analysis in some situations. Suppose we are uncertain why the
businessman took the trip, and to resolve that doubt, we look closely
at his activities in Miami. It then may be important to know which of
these actions were the results of an unforeseen condition-such as
his inability to return to Chicago on schedule because of an airline
strike. The main issue of why he took the trip is more readily kept
separate from the subordinate issue of what he planned on doing while
away if the term intent is used only in connection with the latter and the
terms motive and purpose are reserved for the former. This somewhat
special usage of intent in fact goes beyond situations that involve both
issues. In referring to what actions were planned or were foreseeable, as
distinguished from being "inadvertent," we generally speak in taxation
about the actor's intent rather than his motive or purpose.
While these last two terms may be equally serviceable for addressing
ourselves to whether the actor was pursuing business or personal aims,
the status of many types of transfers which have long been regarded as excluded gifts.
An example is a gift to a close relative made mainly or exclusively to avoid estate tax.
This threat would not be serious once the courts straightened out which motives were
and were not relevant in classifying transfers under the exclusion for gifts.
24 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960). Note the oddity that it is the recipient who has treated
the transfer as a gift on his return, and who must, if the gift treatment is put into issue,
show that the transferor's dominant reason was associated with friendship or affection
rather than commerce. The relevance of the transferee's state of mind in the definition
of a gift for income tax purposes is somewhat puzzling. In Duberstein, the Tax Court said:
"ITMhe intention of the donor is of particular importance, although the recipient's understanding of the nature of the payment is also relevant." 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 16 (1958).
At the time of the Duberstein litigation, transferors in business gift situations often
faced the issue of whether their presents were deductible ordinary and necessary business
expenses or non-deductible personal expenditures (or business expenses that failed to
qualify as ordinary and necessary). Subsequent legislation limiting deduction of business
gifts to $25 a year for each donee has radically altered the posture of affairs and, it
might be added, radically reduced the number of substantial business gifts. See INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(b)(1).
Scholarships and fellowships are another area in which the transferor's reasons for
making the transfer are central to a determination of the transferee's tax position. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 117.
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we here usually talk in terms of purpose and seldom in terms of motive.
Why this usage has developed is not clear, but there are indications it is
connected with the thought, frequently voiced in earlier times, that
taxation should never be concerned with motives. The thrust of that
cliche is simple. If the tax law prescribes that certain tax consequences
attach to specified actions, there seems to be no need to inquire whether
a person had those consequences or some non-tax considerations in
mind when he acted.2 5 As the Supreme Court said in the famous case
of Gregory v. Helvering:26 "[T]he motive of the taxpayer ...

to escape

payment of a tax will not alter the result or make unlawful what the
statute allows." But, as will be seen, the old cliche becomes misleading
whenever the tax rule bases classification of conduct on the actor's state
of mind or incorporates the notion that some acceptable goal other
than the mere saving of taxes is a prerequisite to obtaining a certain
2
advantageous classification. 7
A more instructive, although more conjectural, explanation of the
emphasis on purpose is that our usages have given it a variety of meanings and have ringed it with a greater degree of ambiguity, and this
very looseness makes it more serviceable. 28
25 Another illustration of the point is found in connection with disregarding corporate
entities. A corporation is not to be disregarded if it actually engages in business. But what
if it is set up in accordance with a plan calling for it to engage in business activity at
some not-too-indefinite time in the future? In Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289, 290
n.l (2d Cir. 1956), the court observed: "When there is such an intention, but the intended
business functioning does not become effective, the corporation is not to be disregarded in
the interval before it becomes evident that the corporation will not so function."
26 293 U.S. 465, 468-69 (1935). In analyzing the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Gregory case, Judge Learned Hand on different occasions spoke in terms of motive,
intent, and purpose, and he seemingly thought there were differences in the contents of
these terms. In Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935), he said: "[The
Supreme Court] was solicitous to reaffirm the doctrine that a man's motive to avoid taxaThe
tion will not establish his liability if the transaction does not do so without it....
question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what it appears to be
in form: a marriage may be a joke; a contract may be intended only to deceive others;
an agreement may have a collateral defeasance. In such cases the transaction as a whole
is different from its appearance. True, it is always the intent that controls; and we need
not for this occasion press the difference between intent and purpose. We may assume
that purpose may be the touchstone, but the purpose which counts is one which defeats
or contradicts the apparent transaction, not the purpose to escape taxation which the
apparent, but not the whole, transaction would realize." In Commissioner v. National
Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948), he observed of the Gregory opinion:
"lilt was the purpose for which the taxpayer created the corporation that determined
the event; for it is not the presence of an accompanying motive to escape taxation that is
ever decisive, but the absence of any motive which brings the corporation within the
group of those enterprises which the word ordinarily includes."
27 See Part IV infra.
28 In Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1947), the Supreme Court distinguished between motive and purpose as follows: "One does not have to pursue the
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II
Where purpose is relevant under a particular tax rule, one might
jump to the conclusion that the tax consequences of a certain course of
action somehow depend on the state of mind of the actor-that the rule
is concerned with the relationship between act and actor. Our system is
not that tidy: the term purpose is repeatedly used apart from rules
embodying a state of mind test. The roles assigned to purpose are best
seen after delineating various general types of rules for classifying
actions. Five rough categories seem to be appropriate: (1) The classification of the action rests on ascertaining the actor's state of mind. (2) The
classification ignores the state of mind of the particular actor and
considers what would be the state of mind of an average or typical
person under similar circumstances. (3) The classification of the action
turns on its actual outcome or aftermath. (4) The action is to be
classified by judging whether it is more closely associated with one
activity or another, or more closely fits one function as compared to
others. (5) The rule conclusively prescribes a classification based on the
29
mere occurrence of the act.

A highly oversimplified example might be helpful in blocking out
these categories. Our income tax has in general adopted the policy that
motives behind actions, even in the more ascertainable forms of purpose, to find . . . that
the whole arrangement took this form instead [of another] . . . because the latter
undoubtedly would have [resulted in] . .. taxable income."
29 A so-called "net-effect" test may be regarded a8 a type of conclusory rule. The
difference in thrust between a net-effect type of rule and a comparative relatedness rule
is sharply illustrated by our experience with determining whether a redemption of shares
is substantially equivalent to a dividend or is a disposition of part or all of a shareholder's investment. (See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(1)). In Ballenger v. United
States, 501 F.2d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1962), the court put the difference between the two
types of rules as follows:
"[T]wo lines of decisions appear. The first applies a strict 'net-effect' test. Under this
test, the court must hypothesize a situation where the corporation did not redeem any
stock, but instead declared a dividend for the same amount. The court must then
examine the situation after the dividend and compare it with the actual facts of the case
when stock was redeemed, viewed always from the shareholders' vantage point. The
redemption is equivalent to a dividend if the results from the hypothetical dividend and
the actual stock redemption are essentially the same. . . . [I]t becomes apparent that
every pro-rata redemption will be equivalent to a dividend, for in no way can it result
in any alteration in the relationship of the shareholders, both with respect to their share
of the distribution in question and in respect to future control and profits ....
"The second line of cases is not the direct antithesis of the first. All these cases adopt
the 'net-effect' test, but add a further consideration-whether or not there are legitimate
business purposes for the redemption. .. . Under this approach a pro-rata redemption
of stock can have a business justification sufficient to overcome its resemblance to a
dividend under the 'net-effect' test. The result in any case would depend to a large extent
on the weight to be given the business purposes ...."
See the discussion in Part IV infra regarding business purpose.
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the cost of education is deductible in computing taxable income if the
training is connected with better equipping the taxpayer to carry out
the work of his present profession or employment, but not if it is
connected with learning a new trade or profession. This policy could
be implemented by a rule falling into any of the five categories. 30
Consider, as an illustration, the possibilities for dealing with the case
of a practicing public accountant who pays his way through law school
and eventually gets a degree in law. 31 We might cast a rule in terms of
his state of mind: Did he go to law school with the thought of improving his skill as an accountant, or did he do so with the thought of
becoming a lawyer? Or we might frame the rule in terms of some
hypothetical "average" person's state of mind: In the circumstances
under which the taxpayer went to law school, would an average person
have been trying to improve his competence as an accountant, or would
he have been trying to become a lawyer? Or we might work up a rule
which looked to the aftermath of the action: Did the taxpayer after
finishing law school actually continue in the accounting profession, or
did he switch to being a lawyer? Or the rule could direct attention to
the relatedness seen between accounting work and law school training,
as compared to the relatedness seen between law school training and
other activities: Is undergraduate law training more closely related
to preparation for accounting work or to preparation for practicing
law? Or the rule could simply provide that undergraduate training for
30 In Ramon M. Greenberg, 45 T.C. 480 (1966), a case involving the expenses of a
psychiatrist for psychoanalytic training, the majority, holding against the taxpayer, noted:
"[W]e do not find any place in his testimony where he says [that improving his skills as a
psychiatrist] ... was his primary reason ....
Nowhere in his testimony does he say that
he does not intend to practice psychoanalysis when he graduates from the institute."
Id. at 482. A concurring judge said he could not "agree that the existence of a plan or
intention on the part of the taxpayer to practice as a psychoanalyst has any bearing on
the conclusion whatsoever [because] . . . the expense of acquiring the new skill is
personal in nature." Id. at 483. A dissenting opinion argued that primary purpose was
controlling and that the taxpayer's testimony to the effect that he took the training
for the help it would give him in the field of psychiatry was "not only believable and
uncontradicted but also realistic." Id. at 485. Another dissent argued that the majority
was relying on an earlier case that had mistakenly "substituted result for primary
purpose." Id. at 487.
31 A certified public accountant succeeded in deducting tuition for attending law
school in Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1964); Frank Kilgannon, 24
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 619 (1965). A certified public accountant failed to get a deduction
for the expenses of attending law school in Anthony E. Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959);
Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Welsh v. United States,
329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964), an Internal Revenue Service agent was permitted to deduct
law school expenses even though he left government employment and entered private
practice after becoming a member of the bar. See also Milton L. Schultz, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1372 (1964).
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a degree in law, because it almost always equips a student to perform
in a field for which he was not previously qualified, is never deductible.
The only open question here would be: Was the taxpayer attending
law school as an undergraduate in a degree program?
We are now ready to consider in what sense the term "purpose" may
be employed in the case of rules that are not concerned with the state of
mind of the actor himself. It is convenient to start with classification of
action based on the state of mind of a hypothetical person. The
meaning of purpose-or, for that matter, of motive or intent-would
seem to be the same whether the rule calls for a judgment about the
actor's state of mind or about that of a hypothetical person under
similar circumstances. In theory, there is, of course, a difference between
the two tests. It lies in the point that, although the typical person test
requires that all of the circumstances surrounding the act be considered
in drawing an inference about purpose, idiosyncratic or eccentric
thought patterns of the actor are to be ignored. In the illustrative case
of the accountant who went to law school, a probe for the particular
taxpayer's state of mind conceivably might attach considerable weight
to highly personal testimony, such as, for example, that the actor never
expected to practice law because he hated everything his father stood
for and his father was a lawyer. It is hardly likely, even in this psychologically oriented age, that this kind of a mental fix would be
imputed to a representative accountant.
In practice, the difference between the two tests is apt to be of less
significance than the theory might suggest. Any judgment about an
actor's state of mind, of course, must rest on inferences drawn from
statements and external events which seem to shed some light on his
thoughts. The process is obviously full of pitfalls. Not only may recordations and recollections be corrupted by possible tax consequences,
but the very thoughts that did enter the actor's consciousness may have
been spawned or refined by an awareness of tax considerations. 32 The
temptation to minimize taxes is often perceived as being so great that
in searching for the actor's state of mind, we refuse to pay much attention to anything short of overpowering evidence of aberrations or
eccentricities. Even though the father hating accountant may have
32 "The lawyer, satisfied with a priori reasoning and dialectics, gives more credence to
an admission of evil intent than to a profession of good intent because the former is
against the interest of the declarant. The psychologist, on the other hand, cannot trust
a person's declarations as to what his own intentions are, or what they have been.
Empirically, we know little about intention. The best that psychology can do is to
apply empirical knowledge of related psychological phenomena (e.g., motivation, wishing,
choice, chance) to the problem of intention." Marshall, Relation of the Unconscious to
Intention, 52 VA. L. REv. 1256, 1257 (1966).
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sworn that he was not going to follow in his sire's footsteps, we may
well be reluctant to let him deduct law school tuition solely because of
the evidence he presents on that score. The strong possibility that the
personal idiosyncrasy was manufactured or exaggerated, consciously or
otherwise, in the light of tax awareness tends to draw the hypothetical
and actual state of mind tests closer together. This tendency doubtless
gains reinforcement from the fact that we are naturally disposed to
infer the state of mind of someone else-whether of an actual or
hypothetical person-by engaging in introspection. That process probably blurs much of whatever is left of the distinction that exists in
principle between the two types of tests. Nevertheless, there remain
cases where the force of the taxpayer's presentation convinces us that
his thoughts were not those of the average man.
A broad sampling of cases and administrative pronouncements under
our income tax indicates that, as they are expressed, the rules embodying a state of mind test almost always seem to refer to the thoughts of a
particular actor. The fact is that statements of the rules do not contain
an explicit reference to a typical taxpayer-thus leaving the impression
that it is the thoughts of the particular individual which count. But not
too much should be read into this generalization. In some situations, the
issue probably was never raised; in some, the issue probably was not
faced because unpersuasive testimony concerning the actor's thoughts
was thoroughly discounted in view of obvious tax inducements; and
in some, the distinction probably was regarded as too refined for the
problem at hand. This is not to imply that the hypothetical average
man has no place in classifying actions under the income tax; he often
is somewhere on the scene, and his role will be considered later. All
that is being noted here is that he rarely, if ever, is named as the standard
for classification where a state of mind examination may be called for
by the governing rule.
There is obviously a definite break in principle when we turn from
state of mind rules to those that classify by the outcome of an action,
and it is useful to compare these two types of rules. Admittedly, there
may currently be no tax rules which specifically provide that classification of an action is to be postponed until the outcome of the action is
known.33 Under a few of our conclusory rules, however, a result can be
33 See the tax treatment of preferred stock dividends. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 306.
Whether a later sale or redemption of the dividend shares gets ordinary income treatment
or capital adjustment treatment depends on what the shareholder eventually does with all
his shares in the particular corporation. However, it is not the treatment of the stock
dividend distribution itself which is postponed; that distribution is, with exceptions, not
taxed at all.
There are instances of a court adopting a "wait and see" tax rule and then backing
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changed later if the taxpayer does something that is basically inconsistent with the earlier situation that first qualified him for a tax
advantage. 4 We do have rules, moreover, under which a later event is
classified on the basis of a look-back to earlier happenings.3 5 Further,
in many situations the strategies of controversy seem to leave us with
echoes of wait-and-see type rules. Take the accountant who goes
through law school. If he enters law practice after finishing school, we
do not automatically disallow deduction of the tuition fees on the
ground that in his case the outcome shows that the schooling is to be
associated with becoming a lawyer. (Such a rule would require holding
the ultimate issue in suspense for a year or more following the completion of the school program-a serious practical shortcoming and a
potential source of confusion.) But the accountant's later course of
conduct might nevertheless have a bearing on deductibility where that
issue came up after the completion of his training. If he had in fact
continued his accounting employment unchanged, there would be less
likelihood that a claimed deduction would be resisted by the tax
administrators. If, on the contrary, he had changed his vocation and
had become a practicing lawyer, this fact would be seized upon as
evidence that the schooling had not gone with bettering his capacities
as an accountant. Such an argument might at first appear to be inappropriate if the accepted test concerned state of mind while in
school. Experience tells us, however, that many times a later event is
connected to earlier thoughts. We must therefore consider whether the
probability of a connection is strong enough to warrant reading backward from the outcome to some earlier cogitation by the actor. In any
case, it is reasonable that a heavy burden to demonstrate a favorable
earlier state of mind should be put upon the taxpayer when his subsequent action is inconsistent with his assertions.3 6
away from such an approach. An example is provided by the treatment of an agreement
that both in form and in substance is a contingent lease-or-purchase arrangement. The
court of appeals in Kitchin v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965), originally
decided to treat the arrangement as a straight purchase option and to wait for the

eventual outcome of the transaction between the parties before deciding on its ultimate
tax treatment. But on rehearing the court expressly recognized the difficulties inherent

in that position and concluded that the transaction should be treated as a lease until
such time as the option was exercised. Kitchin v. Commissioner, 353 F.2d 13 (4th Cir.

1965).
34 See INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 302(c)(2)(a), dealing with a shareholder whose interest
in a corporation is completely terminated by redemption of all his shares, but who
thereafter acquires an interest in the corporation. The tax problem is whether the
amount received in redemption is to be treated as a distribution of a dividend or as
the equivalent of a sale of the shares to the company.
35 The tax benefit rule is a good illustration. See INT. RFv. CODE or 1954, § 111.
36 A much quoted version of the point is in Army Times Sales Co., 35 T.C. 688, 704
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These observations suggest a generalization about purpose and outcome. If the governing test classifies actions solely on the basis of outcome, the purpose of the actor is irrelevant. But that purpose is relevant
if outcome is used only as an evidentiary circumstance from which to
infer state of mind as of an earlier time.
In turning to classification of action based on comparative relatedness,3 7 it is useful to begin by juxtaposing this method to classification
based on a hypothetical average person's state of mind. An instructive
problem is how these two tests can possibly differ in operation. Again,
take the accountant case as an example. Suppose it is found that for an
average person in the taxpayer's position, matriculation in law school
would go along with becoming better equipped to function as an
accountant, rather than with entering a new profession. Might it be
consistent to find under a comparative relatedness test that attending
law school is less closely tied to doing accounting work than to practicing law? The answer is yes, and the explanation is that the two tests in
effect invite reflections on the affairs of two different populations. The
hypothetical state of mind test calls for reflection on persons who attend
law school under the configuration of circumstances that describe the
case of the particular accountant. If it is found that the members of this
"group" think that law training goes with improving their skill as
accountants, then we will conclude that for them acquiring a law
training is most closely related to practicing accounting. In contrast,
the comparative relatedness test calls for reflection on all persons who
go to law school. As to this "group," we could plausibly conclude that,
on the whole, attending law school is not most closely related to serving
(1961): "The judicial ascertainment of someone's subjective intent or purpose motivating
actions on his part is frequently difficult. One method by which such ascertainment may
be made is to consider what the immediate, proximate, and reasonably to be anticipated
consequences of such actions are and to reason that the person who takes such actions
intends to accomplish their consequences. This reasoning is implicit in the Latin maxim
'acta exteriora indicant interiorasecreta' and in the more homely English adage 'Actions

speak louder than words."'
An illustration of the use of subsequent events in reaching a determination is provided
in J. J. O'Donnell, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 210, 226 (1964), dealing with the application
of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 269, to deny a carryover of a corporation's net operating

loss: "Subsequent events support the respondent's determination. After control of [the
corporation] ... was obtained by the partnership, the corporation liquidated its inventories
and in a relatively short time ceased to carry on the manufacturing business it had

theretofore conducted. It seems apparent that there was no intention of continuing to
carry on [the corporation's] ... business other than to liquidate existing inventory."
S7 The term "comparative relatedness" (or "comparative resemblance') is admittedly

awkward, but it does serve as a shorthand expression for the type of test more fully
described in the text.

When we speak of an action being "in the nature" of something, we usually are
applying a comparative relatedness test.
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as an accountant. 3 In reasoning in this latter way, however, do we
really engage in anything other than a state of mind inquiry, considering that the same conclusion might very well rest on an inference
about the state of mind of the average law school student? There is a
difference, and in some situations it may be significant. The point is
that to reach the conclusion on a comparative relatedness test, the
inference about the average law student's state of mind is not necessary.
The conclusion might rest at least as solidly on the observation that
most law school graduates do practice law in one form or another-and
this relationship between training and practice would stand regardless
of what might be shown to have been their career thoughts during their
years in law school.
These speculations suggest both how purpose can become associated
with comparative relatedness and why such a usage can be misleading.
On the basis of the general observation about the careers of law school
graduates, one could say that the usual function served by attending
law school is to train for the practice of law. One also could express
this by saying that by and large in our society the purpose of attending
a law school is to practice law. So worded, however, the proposition
might be taken as being based upon state of mind considerations. It
would be more direct and less confusing to say that, in general, matriculating in law school is most closely related to doing law work as a means
of earning income.
It is worthwhile to illustrate a variation of this point with language
in the Regulations defining what business income of an exempt organization is taxable because it is, in the terminology of the statute, "unrelated" to the functions that qualify the organization for exemption.3 9
"Ordinarily, a trade or business is substantially related to the activities
for which an organization is granted exemption," the Regulations say,
"if the principal purpose of such trade or business is to further (other
than through the production of income) the purpose for which the
organization is granted exemption. In the usual case the nature and
size of the trade or business must be compared with the nature and
38 Note how a comparative relatedness test may be used to decide whether a certain
activity is personal or business in nature: "[The principle] . . . may for practical purposes
be said to constitute a distinction between those activities which, as a matter of common
acceptance and universal experience, are 'ordinary' or usual as the direct accompaniment
of business pursuits, on the one hand; and those which, though they may in some
indirect and tenuous degree relate to the circumstances of a profitable occupation, are
nevertheless personal in their nature, of a character applicable to human beings
generally, and which exist on that plane regardless of the occupation, though not
necessarily of the station in life, of the individuals concerned." Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A.
1038 (1939).
39 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 513.
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extent of the activities for which the organization is granted exemption
in order to determine whether the principal purpose of such trade or
business is to further (other than through the production of income)
the purpose for which the organization is granted exemption." 40 This
is an unfortunate use of purpose. It is hardly likely that the Treasury
means to interpret the statutory language-which obviously is concerned with a relationship between exempt function and business
activity-as referring to the state of mind of the organization's officials
in conducting the business. A more defensible interpretation would
focus attention on what the business activity itself, again apart from the
income it produces, in fact does or can contribute to furthering the
function for which exemption is granted. That inquiry might perhaps
be implemented by seeking to learn just what the organization's officials thought the activity did contribute. But the crucial judgment is
not theirs; rather, it is ours-whether we think that the contribution is
sufficiently direct or substantial to warrant classification of the activity
as "related" to the exempt function. Such a determination is not advanced by locating anyone's purpose. 4
The relationship between state of mind and external factors now
may be seen in wider perspective. Judgments about a person's state of
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a)(4) (1958). After this article was set in type, the Treasury took
steps to change the definition of an unrelated trade or business. In place of the test noted
in the text, new Proposed Regulations call for substituting the following: "Trade or
business is 'related' to exempt purposes, in the relevant sense, only where the conduct
of the business activities has causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes
(other than through the production of income); and it is 'substantially related'.., only if
the causal relationship is a substantial one. For the conduct of trade or business from
which a particular amount of gross income is derived to be substantially related to purposes for which exemption is granted, the production or distribution of the goods or the
performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes." 32 Fed. Reg. 5994 (1967).
41 To illustrate: Suppose that there are two identical agricultural colleges operating
identical wheat farms in identical fashion. The fact that the officials of one school think
that its farm is operated primarily to advance the education of its students, while the
officials of the other think that its farm is operated primarily to produce income for the
institution, should not cause the two operations to be treated differently for tax purposes.
Compare the problem of determining the primary purpose of an organization that
operates a business and devotes all the income earned to furthering the functions which,
standing alone, qualify the organization for the tax exemption under § 501(c). State of
mind considerations seem to be wholly irrelevant here. While purpose in this context
conceivably could refer to the use to which all income is finally put, the history of the
governing statutory provision rules out this interpretation. Purpose could also refer to
the size and extent of the business activities compared to the size and extent of activities
in furtherance of exempt functions, taking into account the financial resources available
for such functions. No other meaning of purpose in this context seems germane to the
issue. See Eliasburg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3):-How Much Unrelated
Business Activity?, 21 TAx L. Rav. 53 (1965).
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mind can be made only by considering his own statements and by
42
reflecting on external factors that seem to throw light on his thoughts.
A state of mind test differs from a comparative relatedness test in that
it allows us to entertain evidence on a broader spread of "facts" and
leaves open the possibility of giving more credence to self-serving
declarations. In most instances, we will reach the same result under the
two types of tests, both because the evidence offered under the two
tests will for the most part be the same, and because whenever the
external factors point strongly in one direction we will likely be guided
by them. 43 This means that it is in the "close" cases that the results
reached under the two types of tests are most likely to diverge. When
the external factors are viewed as persuasive, we may nevertheless speak
of the actor's purpose--or motive or intent-but this often becomes
mainly a convenient shorthand around which we group those factors
that we regard as determinative. As we review repeating patterns of
conduct, in some areas of taxation we tend to isolate and to label
various external factors as indicative of state of mind.44 Not infre-

quently we loosely speak as though these factors rather than state of
mind were the ultimate test, thereby creating the impression that a
comparative relatedness test is being invoked. And occasionally a particular external factor or combination of them is regarded as so persuaor absence comes to be treated virtually as a consive that its presence
45
clusory rule.
42 The relative weights to be assigned to what a person says he had in mind in taking
an action and what steps he in fact took are brought into focus by comparing several
situations. If a person incurs expenses in preparation for doing something-such as taking
a business trip-and the action is called off, we may have to rely heavily on his statements in determining how to classify the expenses. If he actually takes the trip, we can
look to what he in fact did while away from his usual base of operations. Even where he
cancels the trip, it sometimes may be possible to rely heavily on his actions rather than
his statements; for example, he may have set up business appointments or committed
business associates to attend.
43 In a recent hobby case, the Tax Court said it could not find that the farm operation
had ever been carried on in good faith for the purpose of making a profit; it noted that
"the large losses sustained year after year speak for themselves." H. V. Monette & Co.,
45 T.C. 15, 47 (1966).
44 Any state of mind test is likely to develop a set of subordinate rules of thumb
which make explicit the external factors that are relevant in ascertaining state of mind.
These make possible some consistency of treatment. See, as an example taken from the
federal estate tax, Estate of Johnson, 10 T.C. 680 (1948), listing eleven relevant factors
in determining whether a gift is or is not in contemplation of death, and pointing out
that the list is not complete.
45 For example, the general rule for determining whether a payment to a retiring
employee is income or an excluded gift to the employee is the dominant state of mind
test as expounded in the Duberstein case. See note 24 supra. Where, however, the employee
involved is a clergyman receiving an honorarium upon retirement from his church,
the transfer is usually treated as a gift without further inquiry. In theory, such cases
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This whole matter may be put somewhat differently by saying that
where under a state of mind test the external factors point strongly one
way, we tend to ignore the actor's self-serving declarations about an
incompatible state of mind because they are not credible. 46 We may
arrive at the same place by saying that a reasonable or typical person
would not have had the asserted state of mind and that the particular
actor has not persuaded us otherwise. In the end, the vital question in
applying a state of mind test may thus be how much allowance we are
47
willing to make for an individual's quirks.
To round out the discussion, we should ask whether state of mind
and comparative relatedness can be combined the other way aroundthat is, by assigning the former a role in determining the latter. An example seems to be furnished by a rule that the Tax Court once advanced
for deciding what expenditures are to be classed as medical expenses
under the statutory deduction for extraordinary medical expenses:
"In determining allowability, many factors must be considered. Consideration should be accorded the motive or purpose of the taxpayer,
but such a factor is not alone determinative. . . . [I]t is important to
inquire into the origin of the expense. Was it incurred at the direction
or suggestion of a physician; did the treatment bear directly on the
physical condition in question; did the treatment bear such a direct or
proximate therapeutic relation to the body condition as to justify a
reasonable belief that the same would be efficacious; was the treatment
in proximate time so near to the onset or recurrence of the disease as to
make one the true occasion of the other, thus eliminating expense inturn on the thoughts of the donor; but the case law has developed what approaches a
conclusory rule of law or an irrebuttable presumption. See Klein, An Enigma in the
Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift," 48 MINN. L. REv. 215 (1963).
In determining when one who holds a house for personal use converts it into an asset
held for the production of income or for profit, courts usually require certain overt acts
to establish the change in the status of the asset. See Rumsey v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
158 (2d Cir. 1936); Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1938); cf. Estate of
Heine, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 738 (1951).
46 In The Huddle, Inc., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 745, 749 (1961), a case involving the
acquisition of a corporation having a loss carryover, the Tax Court said: "Although
[the acquiring party] testified that his principal purpose in entering the transaction and
buying [the acquired corporation's] stock was not to obtain a tax advantage, in our
opinion, the surrounding circumstances and what was done with [the acquired corporation]
immediately after the transaction was closed compel a different conclusion .... "
47 In Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), the court found that,
despite numerous external facts pointing to the contrary, a revenue agent's primary
purpose in taking a full course of study in law was to maintain or improve the skills
required in his employment. The court noted that it had "had the opportunity to listen
to the testimony of the taxpayer and observe his demeanor on the stand," during which
time his "credibility was called squarely into issue," and that it had found "his testimony
logical, consistent and true." Id. at 599.
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curred for general, as contrasted with some specific physical improvement." 48 Under this combination of standards, the role of state of mind
is puzzling. The external factors apparently are not to be treated as
evidence of the taxpayer's state of mind, and state of mind considerations apparently are not to be viewed as illuminating any of the external factors. Such a prescription is unrealistic. If the external factors
suggest that an item is not a medical expense, why should we feel otherwise merely because the taxpayer thought he was spending money to
treat an illness? And if the external factors suggest that an item is a
medical expense, what chance is there that the taxpayer will reveal a
contrary belief? 9
All this suggests that state of mind and external factors can be successfully combined only in one direction: the latter can be used to
throw light on the former, but the process cannot be reversed.
III
Another persistent difficulty encountered in lining up state of mind
and comparative relatedness tests is that any state of mind standard is
likely to be very imprecise. To pinpoint this difficulty, we need to take
a longer look at the problems of promulgating tests based on state of
mind.
Any simple articulation of a state of mind standard is bound to hide
a number of ambiguities. The case of the accountant in law school
again supplies a useful illustration. Let us assume that classification in
this area of education expenses is to rest on the taxpayer's state of mind;
that is, the accountant's tuition in law school is to be deductible if his
purpose in attending law school is to improve his skill as an accountant.
And to sharpen the analysis, let us also postulate that by magic we have
surmounted all the evidentiary barriers and have penetrated to the,
innermost thoughts of the taxpayer.
The first ambiguity is quickly detected. Up to this point, we have
spoken loosely about whether in the accountant's thinking the law
training is associated with improving his performance as an accountant,
Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949).
In the medical treatment area state of mind might be made to play a role where
the expenditure not only alleviated an illness, but also benefited the taxpayer by training
him for an occupation for which he was not formerly qualified. See David E. Starrett,
41 T.C. 877, 881 (1964), in which the majority said of a taxpayer who underwent psychoanalysis that qualified him for admission to a school of psychoanalytic training: "[W]hatever other reason petitioner had for undergoing psychoanalysis, he certainly had the
intention, as soon as he could afford the treatment, to be thereby relieved of the physical
and emotional suffering attendant upon the specific disease from which he had suffered
throughout his adult life."
48
49
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or with becoming a practicing lawyer, or with some other goal. But the
reality, of course, is that we may expect him to have in mind more than
one objective in attending law school. It therefore seems necessary to
be more specific: Is deductibility to turn on whether the qualifying
purpose-assumed here to be improving the taxpayer's abilities as an
accountant-is found to be present to an important degree? Or is found
to be a major purpose? Or is found to be the primary purpose? Or is
found to be the only significant purpose?
The fact is that some of our statutory rules that apparently classify
on a state of mind basis do not indicate what magnitude of the relevant
qualifying purpose is sufficient. An illustration is supplied by the provision that limits deduction for losses or those incurred in transactions
"entered into for profit." 50 In Weir v. Commissioner,5 ' the taxpayer
bought dividend-paying stock in a corporation that owned a building
in which he rented an apartment, and he did so "to have a choice in the
management in order to 'maintain certain standards' "52 in the operation of the building. He sold the stock-at a loss-because he decided
to move out of the apartment. The court of appeals, after observing
that "we have a profit intention, side by side with a non-profit motive,"' 53 put the question whether under these circumstances the taxpayer's intention to profit from the dividends satisfied the statutory
requirement of a transaction "for profit." It concluded that the requirement was met, noting that the policy behind the loss allowance was
that the government in effect said to taxpayers: "[I]f you intend to

benefit us by producing taxable profits, you may take your loss ...-

54

With this viewpoint accepted as a guide, the court decided that the
profit aspect, which was taken "for granted," 55 did not have to be
primary and did not have to be balanced against the personal side of
the transaction.
Other of our statutory tests that might seem to rest on state of mind
are explicitly phrased in terms of "a major" purpose or "a principal"
purpose.5 6 Implementation of these tests calls forth the unexciting question of how much of the specified purpose is enough to satisfy the rule.
1954, § 165(c)(2).
51 109 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1940).
52 Id. at 997.
53 Id. at 998.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. The court presumed that the taxpayer had had a profit motive for investing
in shares likely to yield dividends, and it did not concern itself with whether he had ever
thought about this prospect in making his investment. Such a probe would have been
fruitless; if the taxpayer had been asked, he undoubtedly would have said he had
considered the prospect of dividends from the shares.
56 See note 6 supra.
50 INT. REV. CODE OF

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:485

Nothing very instructive can be said about such an obviously openended issue. Most of what appear to be our state of mind tests, however,
are cast in terms of "the primary" purpose, 57 and it is with regard to
this conception that numerous ambiguities have come to light.
An easily spotted one concerns the time interval that is relevant in
determining primacy of purpose. In the case of the accountant attending law school, should the focus be on his purpose as of the day he applied for admission? Or the day he first attended class? Or every day
he was enrolled in school? Further, should the deductibility of tuition
under the test change with every important change of mind by the taxpayer as to his reasons for being in school? A strict formulation of a
primary purpose test might demand answers to these and similar questions. While answers can readily be produced, we often avoid giving
them. 58 Instead, we seem generally to assume that the taxpayer's thoughts
during the whole or most of the action should somehow be taken into
account. Even when we are asked to be more specific, our responses
frequently are vague. The fact is that under some rules it is far too
awkward or confining to be precise in designating the crucial time span,
mainly because, in a sense, the action that is to be classified is not a single
undertaking but a series of events accompanied by thoughts that differ
one from another. Under such circumstances we sometimes find it more
comfortable to say what time period is not appropriate or controlling
or to indicate the relative importance of the various points of time
covered by the events that we are required to treat as a single action.59
Another ambiguity concerns the meaning of "purpose" when we are
searching for a person's primary purpose. Suppose that before entering
and while in law school the accountant conducted an exhaustive dialogue with himself on why he was interested in studying law. He entertained a number of ideas at one time or another: he figured that law
training might enhance his career as an accountant; he speculated that
he might go into law practice if a good opportunity presented itself;
he had a notion that a law degree might give him status in the eyes of
See note 6 supra.
58 In Owen L. Lamb, 46 T.C. 539, 543 (1966), the Tax Court said that "it seems to us
that the proper time to look for the primary purpose of a taxpayer in obtaining education
is the time that the taxpayer first firmly decides to undertake that education." But the
time problem was easy, for there was "no evidence in the record to indicate that the
petitioner's primary purpose changed at any time throughout his 4-year course of training
and education." Id. at 544.
59 Consider, for example, the case of a dealer in real estate who seeks capital gain
treatment on the ground that certain property sold through his regular sales organization
was held for investment and not for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
In such a case we readily say that an investment objective at the time of acquiring the
asset is relevant but not of great weight, while we draw back from saying that the tax57
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the community and his wife; and he reflected on the possibility that
studying law would be an enjoyable way of utilizing his spare time. In
such a setting, does mere awareness of the possible advantages of attending school become a purpose? Or does purpose refer to the satisfactions
associated with awareness of the various advantages? Or does it imply
some personal resolve or commitment to achieve the contemplated
satisfactions? Again our law does not seem to have found it necessary
to address these questions explicitly. Somehow, we have been able to
operate by equating purpose with an end in view, meaning anything
that is regarded as having had an effect upon producing the decision to
undertake the action being scrutinized. 60 Any other position would
likely be too precarious-especially in view of how little we comprehend about mental processes.
A further ambiguity deals with the requirement of finding a "primary" purpose. Assume that we are able to isolate the accountant's
various goals for attending school and that we agree that these constituted his purposes. Does the search for finding "primacy" among them
call for measurements that presuppose the existence of a common denominator? Here it might be noted that even if we think we can meaningfully weigh various income-producing objectives for attending school,
we should be less sanguine about devising methods for comparing business and personal objectives. If the accountant thought about the pleasures of law school more often or for longer periods than he thought
about its career aspects, would we necessarily conclude that his personal
ends outweighed his professional objectives? Or if his thoughts about
payer's purpose in holding the asset immediately before the sale is crucial. Underlying this
evasiveness may well be a recognition that the substantive law is framing an issue which
is inherently difficult to manage. The mere fact that the dealer sold the asset through his
sales organization suggests that for at least the moment prior to the sale the asset was
being held for sale to the purchaser in the ordinary course of the dealer's business. Yet
this cannot be conclusive, since it would deny capital gain treatment to all property sold
by dealers through their own organizations-even assets that they clearly had held as
investments. We must therefore go back further than the time of sale.
An illustration of how courts have responded to the time issue is furnished by the
instruction given to the Tax Court by the court of appeals in a case involving various
parcels of reality sold by a corporation whose sole business activity over a number of
years had apparently been buying, holding, renting, and selling real estate: The Tax
Court "should not limit its consideration solely to circumstances existing at the time
of sale but should also consider the purpose for which the property was acquired, the
purpose for which it was held, the motive at the time of sale, and the method of sale."
Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1966).
G0 Speaking of the meaning of the phrase "major purpose" in § 1551 of the Code, the
Tax Court has said that "the major quality of a 'purpose' within the framework of the
statutory sections here involved is to be determined in the light of the effect which
consideration of securing the exemption and credit had upon producing the decision
to create or activate the new corporation." Truck Terminals, Inc., 33 T.C. 876, 885 (1960).
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future business possibilities were less intense than his thoughts pertaining to personal pleasure, would we be certain of the conclusion to
be drawn? We might be able to decide that the business aspects were of
small or of great significance, and we might also be able to reach such
a conclusion about the personal pleasure aspects. But is there any theoretical basis for weighing these on the same scale? Wisely, or perhaps
out of necessity, tax law has wholly ignored this challenge, thereby
further increasing the vagueness surrounding any primary purpose
test.
Another ambiguity concerns a different facet of defining "primacy"
in searching for primary purpose. Assume that all the other ambiguities
have been resolved-that we are able to delineate, evaluate, and compare the significance of all the accountant's various purposes in attending law school. Then suppose that our mind-reading score card indicates
that he went through law school because he wanted to improve his
performance as an accountant (weight = 40 per cent), because he
planned to enter the practice of law if a good opportunity turned up
(weight = 40 per cent), and because he expected to enjoy the schooling
(weight - 20 per cent). It is clear that improving accounting skills is
"primary" in the sense that no other single purpose is more significant.
But it is not "primary" in the sense that it outweighs all the other purposes together. It may or may not be "primary" in the sense that it alone
was sufficient to induce the taxpayer to study law. Further, it may or
may not be "primary" in the sense that but for it the taxpayer would
have eschewed the study of law. Any precise statement of a primary
purpose test would obviously need to fix on one of these meanings.
The difficulty in being so precise is illustrated by the recent opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in Malat v. Riddell.61 According to
the statutory rules, profit on the sale of real property is ordinary income
if the asset was "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business," 62 while the profit on
sale of real property "used in" the taxpayer's trade or business qualifies
for capital gain treatment. 63 It is not uncommon to find real estate dealers holding certain properties either to rent or to sell, depending on
what opportunities develop. In Malat, the District Court denied capital
gain treatment upon finding that the properties had been held for the
dual purposes of rental or sale, and that sale had been an essential purpose.6 4 The court of appeals affirmed, using language suggesting that
61 883 U.S. 569 (1966).
1954, § 1221(1).
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
64 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9432 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
62 INT. REV. CODE oF
63 INT.
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under some circumstances capital gain treatment is appropriately denied if both the rental and the sale purposes in holding the asset were
substantial. 5 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that "primary"
means "principal" and not "substantial."
This clarification could be read as being trivial in scope. If the
Court's language were taken literally, the result under the "held principally for sale" standard would differ from that under the "held substantially for sale" standard only in the most unlikely case of an asset
held equally for rent or sale. But such a trivializing view of the Court's
opinion seems unwarranted, especially since another interpretation is
plausible. Suppose it is found that a taxpayer's sole business over a
number of years was buying, holding, renting, and selling real estate,
and that he held a certain building "with the principal objective of
realizing the best profit available therefrom, whether it be from rental
or sale, whichever seemed best at the time." 66 A literal application of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the primary purpose test would
deny capital gain treatment to profit on sale of the particular building
in this situation because the sale purpose did not outweigh the rental
purpose. But, as urged in a recent Tax Court opinion, one could say
that both the sale purpose and the rental purpose were primary in the
sense that both were of the "first importance," as contrasted to being of
"substantial" importance. 67 Such a reading of the proposition that
"primary" means "principal" and not "substantial" would give the
Court's opinion applicability beyond the rare case in which two purposes are exactly equal; moreover, it would harmonize with our awareness that precise definition and measurement of complementary purposes are out of reach.
To all these obstacles of articulating and applying a primary purpose
test, a perceptive contemporary commentator would add another: "The
problem is that the test in many situations simply has no reference or
relation to reality; it presumes the existence of mental phenomenon
that in fact may not occur." 68 The accountant who went to law school,
for example, may never have thought his way through the question of
why he enrolled. In deciding to go to law school, there is no reason for
him to decide what his purposes are. Doubtless, there are numerous
situations in which the actor has had no occasion to put to himself the
question which the tax law raises under the "primary purpose" stan65 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965).

66 Municipal Bond Corp., 46 T.C. 219, 229 (1966). These facts are taken from Municipal
Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20 (1963).
67 Municipal Bond Corp., 46 T.C. 219, 229 (1966).
68 Klein, Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and
Pleasure Trip-A ConceptualAnalysis, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1099, 1110 (1966).
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dard. The test thus often asks us to reach a conclusion based on mental
processes that probably never took place.
While this observation is cogent, we should pause long before invoking it to find serious fault with a primacy of purpose test. Much of our
law presumes that persons complete various mental processes, although
they very likely never go the distance. The law's outlook on primary
purpose is in line with its general postulates that man both is rational
and possesses free will. These are notoriously vast exaggerations. Nevertheless, over the years we probably have not been too far off base in pretending that we can reconstruct the thoughts of people by employing
these postulated characterizations of human nature. A primary purpose
test is hardly more unrealistic or more demanding than many another
familiar construct of the law.
Putting together all these reflections on a primary purpose test, one
conclusion is bound to emerge. The test cannot be made very precise,
and it is workable only so long as a great deal of vagueness is accepted.
In cases that are at all "close," the test can call only for an overall impressionistic judgment-a judgment in which all ambiguities regarding
the meaning of purpose, the evaluation of differing purposes, and the
definition of primary are almost wholly submerged or finessed. A determination of primary purpose in such cases necessarily resembles a jury's
general verdict, and it frequently is no more susceptible to detailed,
structured analysis.
Earlier it was noted that where external factors are given great
weight, there is likely to be difficulty in distinguishing a state of mind
test from a comparative relatedness test. What should now be added is
that this difficulty is greater when classification is put at the level of
overall impressions. It will be recalled that in operation any state of
mind test tends to rest heavily on introspection. As the test is allowed
to become less precise and more impressionistic, we are in many instances less likely to concentrate on the thoughts of the particular taxpayer and more likely to speculate about the total setting.69 The result
is to move the state of mind test even closer to a comparative relatedness test.
This loss of distinctiveness seems to be illustrated by the history of
a change in the Regulations covering the deductibility of travel fares.
69 In analyzing whether old motion picture films, used by their producers in their
businesses of renting films for exhibition, might also be held for sale to television outlets,
the Internal Revenue Service noted that the motion picture industry recognizes "the
distinct possibility that its films might be sold for exhibition on television after being
leased for theater showings," and that producers generally contemplate "sales to television
following such showings as a likely means of exploiting their product." Rev. Rul. 62-141,
1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 182-83, 185.
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For many years the Regulations used language that was construed as
meaning that a primary purpose test governed the'treatment of combination business and pleasure trips. Then the Regulations now in force
were adopted, containing the provision that travel fares in such combination trips are deductible "only if that trip is related primarily to the
taxpayer's trade or business. ' 70 It has been said that a significant change
in principle was apparently introduced-a shift from a state of mind
test to a comparative relatedness one. Yet the change has hardly been
noticed, and there is no evidence of any effect upon the results reached.
The explanation may well be that in practice the two tests become
virtually alike.
IV
Much of the literature on motive, intent, and purpose in taxation
concerns so-called tax avoidance. We turn now to consider the role
assigned to state of mind in deciding what actions or transactions are
to be condemned as constituting tax avoidance.
Let us start with the accumulated earnings tax that is imposed on any
corporation "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders . . .by permitting earnings
and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." 71
The statute refers to "the purpose"; although the point is not free from
doubt, this is usually taken as meaning the principal purpose. A key
provision in the statute states that "the fact that the earnings and profits
of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the
income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the
preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary. '7 2 Thus, at
the heart of the statutory arrangement are two conceptions: (1) the
overriding one of proscribed "purpose"-which in principle seems to
refer to state of mind; and (2) the subordinate one of reasonable business needs--which in principle seems to refer to external factors.7 3 The
two ingredients apparently are to retain independent vitality.7 4 If, for
70

Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1)

(1958).

71 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531, 532(a).
72 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 533(a).
73 "What is here overlooked is that 'the reasonable needs of the business' test . . .
is itself a psychological test. . . . [T]he 'needs of a business' means very little except in
reference to a mental conception of what the business should be or what it requires."
Ballantine, Psychological Bases for Tax Liability, 27 HARv. Bus. REv. 200, 204 (1949).
74 The discussion in the text omits consideration of § 535(c)(1), added in 1958 to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, under which the penalty tax is never imposed to the
extent that earnings and profits are retained for the reasonable needs of the business.
"Even if the taxpayer was motivated by the interdicted purpose, then, no tax would be
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example, it is demonstrated that the accumulation exceeded the reasonable needs of the business, the corporation is nevertheless to be given
the opportunity to rebut the presumption that the proscribed purpose
was present. A review of the litigation, however, reveals that where the
reasonable needs issue goes against the taxpayer, there is only an outside chance of establishing directly a dominant purpose other than the
proscribed one3 5 This asymmetrical relationship between purpose and
external factors is more fully understood when the situation is turned
around and it is assumed or demonstrated that the accumulation could
be justified by the business needs. Prior to a recent statutory change,
the government in theory prevailed here if the tax administrators determined that the accumulation was principally activated by the proscribed purpose, and if the corporation failed to overcome the presumption of correctness that favors the administrative determination. But
how can the taxpayer ever disprove the existence of the proscribed
purpose?76 The most promising avenue lies not in trying to show an
acceptable set of thoughts attributable to the corporation, but rather
in demonstrating that the accumulation was associated with reasonable
needs of the business. The whole point was succinctly put by the court
of appeals in Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner: "While the ultimate

question here is not the reasonable needs of the business, the answer
to that question may well be the single most important consideration in
imposed if the accumulation were found to be reasonable. The implication is that Congress may not really care about the subjective intent of the taxpayer at all." Note, Accumulated Earnings Tax: Burdens of Proof of Reasonableness and Purpose, 54 CALIF.
L. REY. 1050, 1060-61 (1966).
75 Sometimes the taxpayer does succeed. In Heyward & Co. v. United States, CCH
9667, at 87, 187-88 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 1,
1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (66-2 U.S. Tax Cas.)
1966), the court found that the "taxpayer's accumulations of income were far in excess
of the reasonable needs of its business," but that the dominant stockholder's "sole purpose
in having the [corporation] . . . retain its earnings instead of paying them out in dividends was to build a so-called 'reserve' for the protection of the [corporation's] . . . business, and he was not motivated at all by a tax avoidance purpose." The judge commented:
"The taxpayer's accumulations of income were fantastic. I do not believe that one bent
upon tax evasion would have the unmitigated gall to attempt it in such an obvious manner." Id. at 87, 183-84.
The trend, however, is moving in the opposite direction. "Recent judicial decisions
have tended to further reduce the importance of the subjective test .... In [two cases] the
Tax Court concluded, on the basis of an exhaustive study, that all, or a portion, of
the respective corporation's earnings were accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of
the business, and then, without a further sentence of explanation, determined that to
the extent of such unreasonable accumulation the prohibited purpose was present."
Ziegler, The "New" Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Survey of Recent Developments, 22
TAx. L. REv. 77, 79 (1966). The author concludes that the subjective test has been reduced in importance to a "last hope" argument for the taxpayer. Id. at 81.
76 Of course, the reasons why a corporation does something can only be the reasons
why those guiding the corporation cause it to act as it does.
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concluding whether the taxpayer acted with a proper purpose in mind,
or the proscribed one." 77 The upshot is that, despite a statutory test
framed in terms of purpose, state of mind turns out to have surprisingly
18
little significance.
These reflections on state of mind and business needs set the stage
for viewing parallel relationships, but of much broader reach. In a
number of areas the statutory rules explicitly prescribe that certain
actions involving the use of business entities are to be accorded advantageous tax treatment provided that the actions are not tainted by tax
avoidance. For example, where a corporation is divided among its owners into two or more corporations, the tax result under specified conditions is to depend on whether the action was "in pursuance of a plan
having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income
tax." 79 And although our law has never developed an all-embracing
principle that every action must pass an anti-tax avoidance threshhold
before qualifying for favorable tax treatment, traces of such a notion
have been read into numerous statutory provisions.8 0 On quick impression, all variations of the anti-tax avoidance principle may appear to
rest on a state of mind foundation; for they seem to announce that if
a taxpayer does something with the thought of avoiding taxes, he will
not be permitted to enjoy the tax advantage he sought.
A moment's reflection will show why such an interpretation of the
anti-tax avoidance principle is untenable. In our society all taxpayers
can be expected to arrange their affairs so as to minimize taxes, and in
general we do not condemn actions that save taxes. If tax-reducing actions are to pass muster but tax avoidance actions are to be penalized,
some way of distinguishing between the two must be located. The
trouble is that, as a mental phenomenon, a desire to minimize taxes
does not differ from a desire to avoid taxes. It clearly would be foolish
to attempt to define tax avoidance as merely a more intense or pervasive
version of tax minimization. Conceivably, one might try to separate the
tax reduction thoughts from all the non-tax thoughts associated with
77

281 F.2d 488, 490-91 (Ist Cir. 1960).

78 As a historical curiosity, it might be noted that, when the constitutionality of the

tax on improper retention of earnings was challenged, the Supreme Court took the questionable view that the tax was not based on state of mind because "the existence of the
defined purpose is a condition precedent to the imposition of the tax liability" upon the
retained earnings. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 289 (1988).
79 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii).
80 Some commentators have urged that it is "much more difficult ... to enforce liability
dependent on such illusive criteria [as motive] when the part to be played by such criteria
is nowhere specified in the statute." Sutherland, Taxpayers Motive as a Basis for Taxability, N.Y.U. 8TH INST. ON FED. TAx 990, 991 (1950). The analysis in the text suggests
that the proposition is of doubtful validity.
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an action, and then treat a comparatively large quantity of the former
as tax avoidance. But such an approach, aside from being wholly impractical, would lack justification. It would penalize taxpayers who
sought professional counsel or were familiar with the tax laws, while
rewarding those who were uninformed about the tax system or placed
a low value on conserving dollars.
The usual course around these difficulties has been to compare the
importance of the actor's tax reduction objective-sometimes required
by statute to be presumed-and of his non-tax objectives, if he has any.
Tax avoidance is then, in effect, defined as an action taken under circumstances where the non-tax goals are of insufficient weight as balanced against the tax reduction goal. 8 ' Under this approach, the taxpayer has the burden of showing the existence and significance of any
non-tax objective.8 2 Usually, the most convincing proof is a demonstra81 No general statement can be made about the "weight" an acceptable purpose must
have in order to tip the scales. This matter is dealt with differently in various areas of
tax law.
Some of the anti-tax avoidance provisions leave us with a difficult problem of defining
the proscribed action. Consider, for example, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341, dealing
with so-called collapsible corporations. The section penalizes shareholder gains which
are associated with a collapsible corporation. Collapsibility is presumed if certain external facts are present and if the absence of collapsibility is not shown. The central
notion in the definition is that a corporation is collapsible if it is "formed or availed of
principally for the manufacture, construction, or production of property . . . with a
view to-(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders . . . or a distribution to
its shareholders before the realization by the corporation . . . of a substantial part of
the taxable income to be derived from such property, and (B) the realization by such
shareholders of gain attributable to such property." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b). The
phrase "with a view to" has been defined to mean "intending" or "calculating upon or
contemplating as a desired result." The statute does not indicate what degree of "intending" calls into play the penalty provisions. The Treasury Regulations interpret the
statute to mean that the intent requirement is satisfied if the collapsible transaction was
"contemplated by those persons in a position to determine the policies of the corporation"
and if the transaction was merely contemplated by them "unconditionally, conditionally,
or as a recognized possibility." Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a)(2) (1955). This seems to indicate
that it is sufficient for the controlling persons to have recognized or known that the possibility of collapse existed and that there would be a gain to shareholders. A commentator
has complained that the statutory use of the term "view" requires "a subjective inquiry,
and this is something more than a conscious regard of the possibility of collapse. It is felt
that . . .the requisite view must be one which is contemplated as a substantial reality,
although such need not be the dominant reason. 'Substantial reality' means a strong or
true state of facts. When applied to intent it means something less than a dominant intent ....
" Pelletier, Shareholder Intent and Congressional Purpose in the Collapsible
Corporation Morass, 20 TAx L. REv. 699, 710-11 (1965).
82 Where a corporation is involved, there is a question whether acceptable non-tax
objectives include objectives that serve only the personal or non-corporate business interests of the shareholders, as opposed to objectives that advance the interests of the
corporation. See Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962), which
took the latter view; cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1955). There is a high degree of artificiality in conceiving of the corporation as having objectives wholly apart from those of
its shareholders.
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tion that the action in question did serve or plausibly could have served
a significant non-tax goal. 83 If the taxpayer succeeds in showing an im-

portant non-tax goal, we are drawn to conclude that the tax reduction
objective was comparatively not so great that the action amounted to
tax avoidance. If the taxpayer cannot make such a showing, we are
84
drawn to the opposite conclusion.
The balancing point is not a constant for all tax rules that incorporate an anti-tax avoidance principle. Because these various substantive rules have vastly differing potentials for tax minimization and
because in our tax structure they serve functions of differing significance, certain of them may be viewed as calling for weightier non-tax
goals than do others. Such differentials are not to be found on the face
of the rules, but rather they develop in the process of our applying the
rules and observing the consequences.
In some types of situations, we regard the plausibility of a particular
non-tax objective as so low that we eventually fashion a general rule
that precludes ever giving any weight to that objective. This development may be illustrated by the history of the litigation relating to the
plan of purchasing a deferred annuity contract and then "borrowing"
against the cash value of the policy simultaneously with the payment of
each premium. The tax reduction objective of the plan was clear. The
taxpayer hoped first to deduct the "interest" he paid on the "borrowed"
cash value, and later to realize the increased cash value of the policy
(attributable to interest earned on the premiums) in the form of a capital gain rather than ordinary income. On its surface, the arrangement
had the effect of giving the taxpayer an option, enforceable at a future
date, to annuitize a sum of money at the interest rate and mortality
assumption reflected in the annuity contract. When the Supreme Court
83 Proposed regulations would deny taxpayers relief from an unfavorable reallocation
of charges among related business entities under § 482 of the Code unless the circumstances
giving rise to the reallocation "did not have as one of their principal purposes the
avoidance of Federal income tax." It has been strongly contended that "the 'tax avoidance' concept appears to contribute little to a rational resolution of the question at issue,"
and that a more appropriate standard would be whether "the arrangements or transactions ... reflected an effort in good faith to comply with the tests set forth in the final
regulations under Section 482 or otherwise to arrive at changes comparable to those
which would have resulted from arm's length bargaining between unrelated parties."
Miller, Proposals for Amelioration of Section 482 Allocations Affecting U. S. Taxpayers
with Foreign Affiliates, 44 TAxEs 209, 254-55 (1966) (emphasis deleted).
84 In most cases won by the government under a business purpose test, the actor is
unable to establish that he had any business purpose that was more than trivial or made
up out of whole cloth. There are cases, however, in which the courts talk as though they
believe that there were mixed motives-tax reduction and business objectives-and that
the former was predominant. See, e.g., J. T. Slocumb v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 269 (2d
Cir. 1964). In some of these mixed motive cases it seems likely that, if pressed, the courts
would find the asserted objectives to be fictitious or insubstantial.
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considered the arrangement in Knetsch v. United States,85 the majority,
in essence, held that there was no borrowing but only a payment to
obtain a tax advantage-and that without a loan there could be no interest element to deduct. In arriving at its result, the Court must have
concluded that the asserted non-tax goal of acquiring annuity rights
(or of creating, through borrowing the cash value, what might have
been characterized as creating an option to annuitize a sum in the
future on guaranteed terms) was not sufficiently plausible to merit consideration.8 6 Once this step had been taken, other participants in
similar annuity borrowing plans who litigated their rights to interest
7
deductions lost hands down.
In determining whether the anti-tax avoidance threshold has been
satisfied, not every type of non-tax objective is necessarily to be taken
into account. In the area of corporate adjustments, for example, the
statutory rules provide that the only non-tax goals that count are those
that can qualify as "business purposes."88 But in the case of some other
statutory provisions, the courts have indicated that all non-tax purposes
are to be considered. In the recent case of Goldstein v. Commissioner,89
for example, the taxpayer borrowed at interest to buy government
85 364 U.S. 361 (1960).

86 See Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 135.
87 One commentator put the Knetsch case in these terms: "Although some writers
have rationalized the decision on lack of economic significance, it is not economic significance which was absent from the transaction (which had significant results in payment of spendable dollars by the taxpayer and realization of taxable income by the payee)
but an economic purpose other than tax saving. Putting the question in terms of net
effect would result in the same answer. Here, as in the Gregory case, inquiry into the
objective economic purpose of the taxpayer can avoid delving into his subjective motive
only because the question is so clear on its facts that the transaction could not have
had an economic purpose, or motivation, apart from tax avoidance. The possibility of a
business purpose is absent ....
However, as in the business purpose cases, the rationale
of Knetsch becomes unpredictable in its application to situations involving possibilities
of economic gain as well as tax advantage." Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions
and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TUL. L. REv. 355, 370-71
(1963).
88 A particular business purpose which is regarded as sufficient under one statutory rule
may not be considered sufficient under another. See Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin-Off,
1967 DuKE L.J. 1, 30-35.
Courts do not always apply a business purpose test to corporate transactions that
have a high potential for tax reduction. In Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220
F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955), the court refused to apply such a test to a transfer in the form
of a sale to a wholly-owned corporation, saying that "we would be most reluctant to impose a court-made requirement of a business purpose independent from taking a gain
or loss, in determining the genuineness of sales in general, since it is common knowledge
that vast numbers of sales have been made and are still being made for the purpose of
taking gains and losses at times which provide the optimum tax benefits." Id. at 175.
89 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
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obligations yielding a lesser rate of interest in order to shift taxable income from one year to the next. After noting that "there is no requirement that deductible interest serve a business purpose, that it be ordinary and necessary, or even that it be reasonable," the court of appeals
took the position that the deduction for interest payments is available
where, in borrowing money, the taxpayer desires "to engage in purposive activity." 90 According to the court, "the interest deduction should
be permitted whenever it can be said that the taxpayer's desire to secure
an interest deduction is only one of mixed motives that prompts the
taxpayer to borrow funds; . . . the deduction is proper if there is

some substance to the loan arrangement beyond the taxpayer's desire
to secure the deduction." 91 Apparently any non-tax goal would satisfy
this criterion.
The purposeful activity approach may conflict with another principle
of our tax system. In some situations, as noted later, we may wish to
permit the form of a transaction to govern its tax consequences without
an inquiry into whether non-tax goals are served by use of the particular form. It might appear that the two policies could be reconciled by
holding that where form is to govern, it is to do so only if the action
itself is purposeful. Accepting such a doctrine, however, would amount
to abandoning the notion that in certain situations form alone is to
control, regardless of any other considerations.
Further light on the role of state of mind in the anti-tax avoidance
area is shed by looking at the situation where it is agreed that the parties did not harbor tax minimization thoughts. What should be the
result, for example, where it is found that a corporate adjustment "had
no business reason and . . . had no tax avoidance purpose," but that

the change put the shareholders in such a position that they "have and
will continue to have a tax advantage whenever they chose to make use
of it, even though . . . they never thought of the reorganization in

terms of a tax advantage"? 92 The court of appeals in the recent case of
Commissioner v. Wilson candidly stated that "in this practical area of
taxation, so much in the way of liability for taxes can hardly be allowed
to depend solely upon what goes on in someone's mind."9 3 It then went
at 741.
91 Ibid.
92 Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (1965).
93 Ibid. The Code section governing corporate divisions-the type of adjustment involved in the 'Wilson case-states that to come within the section's advantageous provisions, a transaction must not be used principally as a device for the distribution of
the earnings and profits of either of the resulting corporations. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 355(a)(1)(B). It has been said: "This is a statutory underlining that the business purpose,
anti-tax avoidance doctrines are here specially relevant-a statement that Congress is
90 Id.
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on to say that the mere absence of thought about tax consequences
should not be enough to qualify a corporate adjustment for advantageous treatment: "Congress . . . was trying to give business leeway in
readjusting their corporate arrangements to better suit their business
purposes. If the rearrangement had that purpose, Congress was willing
to concede them some possible tax advantages. If the rearrangement
had no business purpose, let the taxes fall where they might."' 9 4 Under
this view, it is the presence of an acceptable purpose rather than the
absence of tax reduction thinking that is the decisive concern. 5
It is instructive to note several troublesome questions that might be
relevant to deciding whether in a particular case an acceptable and
sufficiently important non-tax reason exists for an action that clearly
does reduce taxes9 6 As an illustration, let us consider application of the
aware the area is one of high tax avoidance potential and is demanding that administrators and courts approach it with the necessary alertness and sophistication." SuRREY &
WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1640 (1960 ed.).
9103, at 85,014 (9th Cir. 1965).
94 Commissioner v. Wilson, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
95 Predicating tax consequences on a finding of business purpose has been attacked
as unsatisfactory: "In the first place it requires the ascertainment of the ultimate purpose
of those in charge of the business, a task which at best is extremely difficult. In the
second place it places business men under a cloud of uncertainty and prevents them from
foreseeing with any accuracy the effect of their present transactions. Thirdly it opens the
door for the substitution of the business judgment of the tax officials, who often have
none, for that of the taxpayers involved." Sutherland, Taxpayers' Motive as a Basis for
Taxability, N.Y.U. 8TH INST. ON FED. TAx 990 (1950).
Use of a business purpose doctrine in deciding whether to recognize devices designed
to split income among members of a family has been criticized as improper: "The
reasoning of the courts, however, has rarely included a consideration of whether Congress
intended the tax benefits to be extended to the transaction in question. Generally, as
soon as the court finds that no valid business purpose exists the tax benefits are automatically disallowed. There is virtually no recognition of the fact that the mere failure
to serve business or [other] . . . non-tax purposes does not necessarily indicate that the
device is entitled to no tax recognition. For example, even though the gift and lease
back device generally does not perform a non-tax function [other than altering the allocation of taxable income] ... does not indicate that the device is unworthy of tax recognition." Note, Income Splitting as a Means of Avoiding Taxes, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1289,
1327-28 (1966). See Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 532 (1965).
96 In places the statutory language is not clear whether the test for classifying a transaction calls for weighing business purpose against tax reduction possibilities or for looking only to the net effect of the transaction. An example is the provision that a distribution in redemption of shares is not a dividend if it "is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(1). In Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d
607 (5th Cir. 1954), where the distribution was pro-rata among the shareholders, a dissent
argued that this fact plus the presence of a large undistributed surplus were sufficient
to make a dividend classification appropriate, and that business purpose and the intent
of the taxpayer were immaterial in determining the effect of the transaction. The majority,
however, took the position that whether a distribution is essentially equivalent to a
dividend is a question of fact to be decided after considering all circumstances, including
business purpose and the intent of the shareholders. See note 29 supra.
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statutory provision denying certain normally available tax benefits
where a person acquires a corporation or corporate property for the
principal purpose of obtaining those tax benefits.9 7 Assume that all the
stock of a corporation having a large operating loss carry-forward is
acquired by an individual proprietor, who then transfers his established
business into the corporation. Assume also that the acquired corporation has a combination of assets which are readily usable in the proprietor's business, and that the proprietor asserts he bought the shares
in order to get control of these assets. 98 How should we go about deciding whether deduction of the loss carry-forward against income generated after purchase of the shares is to be denied on the ground that
the principal purpose of the acquisition was to obtain the benefit of the
carry-over?
A first question is whether we ought to regard getting control of the
corporation's assets as a significant purpose if it can be shown that the
acquirer could have obtained them by another route, albeit one that
would not have afforded him the opportunity to benefit from the loss
carry-forward. Are we, in short, to infer the absence of a particular
asserted purpose from the presence of a reasonable commercial alternative? To take such a road would come close to indulging in the absurd
proposition that people should act so as to maximize their taxes. It
seems more fitting to ask whether the acquirer would have gone through
with the transaction as structured even in the absence of any tax advantage, and then to say that an affirmative answer indicates that he had a
non-tax purpose in view.99
A second question deals with the weighing of objectives. In determining whether a non-tax objective was or was not the principal purpose,
should account be taken of the dollar significance of both that objective and the tax advantage that was sought? 00 The difficulty here is
97 INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954,
98 If there is a discrepancy

§ 269.

between the design the acquirer professes to have had in
mind and his later conduct, a heavy burden is on him to show that there was a plausible
reason for his change in plans.
09 This position puts on the party seeking favorable tax treatment the burden of showing not only that there was a business reason for the transaction, but also that there was
a business reason for choosing the favorable tax route as against less favorable routes. See
Shaw Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963).
100 This problem was dealt with in F. C. Publication Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962), which involved the acquisition of a corporation
having a loss carry-over. The acquiring taxpayer "contended in the Tax Court that although the tax loss carry-over was considered, the principal motivation was that it was
felt to be a good opportunity to get into a new area of magazine publishing which would
produce considerable revenue." Id. at 780. The taxpayer strongly urged that "the
risk of loss in the transaction is too great compared with the possible tax gain, and that
responsible business people do not take such chances, so that the principal purpose
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that tax aspects ordinarily can be easily translated into dollar terms,
while other considerations frequently cannot be readily quantified.
Nevertheless, a determination of primacy among objectives ought not
to ignore dollar magnitudes, no matter how rough and vague the comparison has to be. Common sense tells us that the strength of a tax reduction goal undeniably is greater when the saving is in the millions
rather than in the hundreds of dollars.
A third question is whether evidence that the acquirer had the tax
advantage in mind ought to be taken into account in weighing the relative importance of the tax and the non-tax purposes. The mere fact
that he was interested in the tax benefit should not matter, for if it did,
as noted earlier, we would be penalizing the knowledgeable person and
rewarding the ignorant. But evidence that the acquirer regarded the
tax benefits as having high importance surely is entitled to great weight
in ascertaining whether enjoyment of the favorable tax aspects of the
transaction constituted the principal purpose. 1 1
A fourth question is what significance should be attached to evidence
that the acquirer did not know of the potential tax advantage associated
with the acquisition. While such evidence tends to show that the acquirer had no important tax purpose, 10 2 it is likely to be self-serving.
Moreover, it does not foreclose the possibility that although the acquirer was unaware of the tax benefit at the start of the transaction, he
learned of it before completion. 10 And there is always the possibility
cannot have been the tax gain." Ibid. The court responded: "A fairly strong case is
made that the possible gain from tax savings is disproportionately small. The balance
of the argument, however, has its weaknesses. Business people, even very successful business people, do make mistakes, particularly where an apparently effortless gain from the
Government is in sight. An equally permissible inference which may be drawn from the
evidence is that a business error was made, that the cost of carrying on [the planned]
project was underestimated, and the certainty of the loss allowance was viewed too sanguinely. Most important, the testimony and contemporaneous writings of the petitioner's
editor make it quite plain that the anticipated tax result was the prime factor in the
acquisition." Id. at 780-81.
101 In James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1960), involving the
issue whether multiple surtax exemptions would be allowed in a multiple corporation
setup, the court placed emphasis on testimony that "a great deal of consideration was
given to taxes" and that the parties "were very careful to keep the [taxable income] figures
under [the level of surtax exemption]." Id. at 397.
102 See Baton Rouge Supply Co., 36 T.C. 1, 14 (1961), where an asserted absence of
knowledge of a loss carry-over at the time of acquisition was treated as a strong factor
in the taxpayer's favor.
103 In establishing a business purpose, the parties may advance their cause by showing
that the transaction was conceived before the tax advantages were known to them. Thus,
in The Esranco Truck Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1963), involving § 269 of the Code,
the Tax Court attached significance to the fact that an attorney had first advised setting up
three corporations rather than one in order to limit tort liability, and then had "consulted with [the client's] ... accountant as to whether there would be any disadvantageous
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that the acquirer's ignorance was itself induced by his interest in being
able to make out a case that tax reduction was not his purpose. In the
more extreme situations we might treat ignorance by design as the
equivalent of knowledge.
Looking at all four questions together serves to underscore an important and by now familiar point. Although in these tax avoidance
controversies the conclusion often is framed in what appear to be state
of mind terms-that is, we say that in taking a particular action a person did or did not have a non-tax purpose or a tax avoidance motivethe battle is seldom fought on state of mind grounds. Rather, the usual
approach is to focus the analysis on whether any non-tax goals or functions were or plausibly could have been served by the action. 10 4 Sometimes we ask for a showing that one in the actor's position could reasonably have believed that an asserted non-tax objective would be served
by the course of conduct. But only infrequently do we pay much attention to whether the actor himself really had a certain non-tax objective
in mind when he engaged in the transaction. 105 All in all, the role of
tax consequences by forming three corporations. Upon the accountant's assurance that
the tax consequences were favorable rather than unfavorable, the plan was executed."
Id. at 294.
But compare the thought advanced by the Tax Court in another case: "We are concerned here with [the acquiring party's) . . . principal purpose in acquiring all of the
[acquired corporation's] . . . stock at the time the transaction was closed-not with his
purpose in entering into the entire transaction at the time he first discussed it with [the
prior owner of the corporation] . . . and looked over the property. Of course his initial
purpose in entering into the transaction might well have considerable bearing on his
reasons for acquiring [the] . . . stock but it is not necessarily determinative of his purpose in buying [the] . .. stock. He may have had one purpose for entering into the transaction and another purpose in carrying it out in this manner." The Huddle, Inc., 20
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 745, 748-49 (1961).
104 The asserted business reasons must be plausible under the circumstances of the
particular case. Thus, the Tax Court, in commenting on the business purposes that
were claimed to have been served by using multiple corporations in the development of
a real estate subdivision, said: "We are convinced . . . from our study of all the facts and
circumstances that none of the alleged advantages in the use of multiple corporations ...
constituted any actual business purpose in the instant case. The alleged business purposes
impressed us simply as a lawyer's marshalling of possible business reasons that might conceivably have motivated the adoption of the forms here employed but which in fact
played no part whatever in the utilization of the multiple corporation structure." Aldon
Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582, 597-98 (1959).
105 Occasionally, courts appear to insist that the asserted business purpose must have
activated the transaction in question. For example, in Weyl-Zuckerman & Co., 23 T.C.
841 (1955), the Tax Court said: "Moreover, the requisite business purpose or intention
must be established by evidence; it is not enough for counsel to theorize as to what the
intention might have been. It must be shown by satisfying evidence that the alleged
business purpose was in fact entertained as a motivating factor by petitioner or its responsible representatives; a possible business purpose conceived after the event in order
to give color to the transaction cannot retroactively supply the required bona fides which
might otherwise be lacking." Id. at 847.
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any state of mind inquiry is very much smaller than the rhetoric might
06
seem to suggest.
What emerges is that an anti-tax avoidance principle tends in practice to resemble a comparative relatedness test. Often the critical question, in effect, ultimately becomes: How close is the relationship that
can be seen between action of the kind taken and the asserted non-tax
07
objectives?
106 A "business purpose" test may be of either an objective or a state of mind nature.
In the objective version the inquiry essentially is whether the particular transaction
came dose enough to our model of what a reasonable businessman would have done
under the circumstances. In the state of mind version the inquiry is whether the actor
actually believed he was acting for business reasons--even if in so doing he failed to
live up to our standards of reasonable business conduct.
An instructive sidelight on the relationship between state of mind inquiries and administrative limitations is found in an extraordinary pocket of the law: "Section 367 of
the present Code provides that in an attempted tax-free exchange involving a foreign
corporation, the latter will not be regarded as a corporation unless prior to the transaction the Commissioner was satisfied that the exchange did not have as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax. The National Office of the Internal
Revenue Service, which processes applications for determinations by the Commissioner
that the requirements of section 367 are satisfied, has no facilities for pursuing an inquiry
into the subjective purposes of the taxpayer. It may therefore be speculated that the
administrative application of section 367 replaces the subjective criterion of the statutory
language with a standard based on the demonstrable results that may be expected from
the proposed tax-free exchange and transactions that might follow." Fuller, Business
Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37
TUL. L. REv. 355, 391 (1963).
107 It never is very productive to ask whether the taxpayer was acting pursuant to a
tax avoidance motive. The acknowledged presence of a desire to reduce taxes may call
for paying greater attention to ascertaining whether a non-tax objective was also in
the picture and to assessing the significance of such an objective. Perhaps this is what
is behind the frequently voiced thought that when the scent of tax avoidance is in the
air, the transaction in question should be subjected to greater than usual scrutiny.
It is instructive to note the Australian experience with a statutory catch-all, anti-tax
avoidance rule that provides: "Every contract, agreement, or arrangement made or entered into, orally or in writing, whether before or after the commencement of this Act,
shall so far as it has or purports to have the purpose or effect of in any way, directly or
indirectly-(a) altering the incidence of any income tax; (b) relieving any person from
liability to pay any income tax or make any return; (c) defeating, evading, or avoiding
any duty or liability imposed on any person by this Act; or (d) preventing the operation
of this Act in any respect, be absolutely void, as against the Commissioner, or in regard
to any proceeding under this Act, but without prejudice to such validity as it may have
in any other respect or for any other purpose." Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1950, § 260, 3 COMmW. Aars 1901-1950, at 2254-55 (1953) (Aust.).
A commentator summed up the judicial treatment of this provision as follows: "Mt
is suggested that the proposition laid down [by the Privy Council in a leading case] ...
cannot be considered as any mechanistic test for "purpose," indeed scarcely a test at all,
but little more than an injunction to the courts to exercise discrimination in the application of the section. Those arrangements which possess a prima facie plausibility, i.e.,
are capable of explanation by reference to any dealing which has no purpose of avoiding
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V
By now it should be readily understood why conscientious tax administrators might have conflicting attitudes toward rules that seek to
classify actions on the basis of purpose. One attitude is commonly displayed in the case of rules under which tax consequences turn heavily
on the form in which a transaction is cast. The inclusion of a purpose
test in such a rule is applauded because it reduces the ability of taxpayers to manipulate the forms so as to secure tax advantages and thus
limits those advantages to the "deserving" situations. 108 An altogether
different attitude on the part of the administrators is sometimes evident
in the case of rules that look to the actor's principal purpose but do not
tax, are to be distinguished from those which in the light of their effect on tax
liability are so blatant or outrageous that a purpose of avoiding tax is patently
obvious on the face of the arrangement. The rule is little more than the recognition of a judicial discretion to determine and strike down "obvious" attempts at
tax avoidance, yet to so delimit the sphere of operation of the section as to leave untouched transactions occurring in the normal flow of business or family affairs whether
or not these transactions have the effect of avoiding tax, and whether or not they are
animated by this purpose." Trebilcock, Section 260: A Critical Examination, 38 Ausm. L.J.
237, 24243 (1964).
Section 138 of the Canadian Income Tax Act provides: "Where the Treasury Board
has decided that one of the main purposes for a transaction or transactions . . . was
improper avoidance or reduction of taxes that might otherwise have become payable
under this Act ... the Treasury Board may give such directions as it considers appropriate
to counteract the avoidance or reduction." CAN. REv. STAT. c. 148, § 138 (1) (1952). Study
No. 22 for the Royal Commission on Taxation notes that this provision appears to suffer
from several weaknesses, including: "(a) The intention of the taxpayer must be considered. . . . This is a subjective test and difficult to apply. (b) It is unreasonable to
blame a taxpayer for taking taxation factors into account in managing his property
when, quite independently of this factor, the transaction or transactions in question are
in accordance with normal business practice. (c) The provision implies that there are
proper ways of avoiding tax and that in such cases the provision cannot be invoked....
The legislature has thus taken pains to point out that tax avoidance may be improper
without necessarily contravening any other provision of the Act. At the same time, however, the Act gives no definition of what is meant by the words 'improper avoidance or
reduction of taxes."' RoYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, STUDY No. 22, pp. 358-59 (1964).
The Study recommends that: "The Income Tax Act should contain a provision to the
effect that in computing tax all artificial transactions which have the effect of reducing
the amount of tax payable should be disregarded. Such transactions should be defined
as transactions which while legally valid are contrary to normal business practice or
would be contrary to normal business practice if their purpose were not to reduce the
tax payable." Id. at 363.
See also LAPmOTH, EVASION AND AvoIDANcE OF INcOME TAX: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
ENGLISH LAw AND ISRAELI LAw (1966).
108 See Paul, Motive and Intent in Federal Tax Law, in SELEcTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 255 (2d ser. 1938). The inclusion of a state of mind element in a rule does,
however, tend to increase "uncertainty" and to reduce "predictability" by widening the
range of factors that are relevant to classifying an action. See Blum, Some Off-Center
Observations About Our Tax System, N.Y.U. 16th INsT. ON FED. TAx 1 (1958).
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rely heavily on form.
The results under these latter rules often are
very likely to turn on a combination of the point that in "close" situations there is a tendency to regard the test as calling for an overall
impressionistic judgment, and of the point that the taxpayer by and
large is in command of telling the story and creating evidence for the
record. The taxpayer can be expected to testify that his action was associated with a purpose that qualifies for advantageous tax treatment.
The argument in opposition must in most instances rest heavily on
inferences drawn from the action itself or from weaknesses detected in
the taxpayer's assertions. With affairs in this posture, a strong showing
of any qualifying purpose will often carry the day for the taxpayereven though an uncovering of all the facts would have revealed another
purpose as primary. Thus, a primary purpose test frequently turns into
a significant purpose test, with the taxpayer in control of the presentation.
In areas where the results seem to depart too often from what he
views as the realities, a reflective tax administrator understandably
might seek to replace a purpose test with a rule of classification based
on the action itself. For example, not long ago, at the urgings of revenue
officials, the statutory provision for dealing with travel fares in the case
of combined business and pleasure trips was markedly altered, though
only for a brief time. 10 The old language, which had been implemented
by a principal purpose test, was changed to provide for an allocation of
the fare between business goals (which qualified for deduction) and
non-business objectives (which did not qualify), the apportionment to
be on the basis of the relative amount of time spent during the trip on
the various pursuits.':" The new test was largely repealed before it was
put into operation-apparently for reasons mainly political.
Another illustration, taken from the realm of litigation rather than
legislation, concerns the unusual question of the deductibility of legal
fees incurred by a husband in connection with incompetency proceedings instituted by his wife. In Lewis v. Commissioner,112 the taxpayer,
109 A cynical view is that administrators usually find vagueness in any area to be
highly congenial. Ambiguity in a governing rule confers power on them and precludes
effective criticism of their actions. Thus, vagueness makes their jobs more interesting
and, from their point of view, perhaps more important.
110 INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 274(c), prior to amendment by P.L. 87-272, § 217(a).
Every transaction that has business and personal aspects could in theory be divided
into these two components. However, this would be impossible from an administrative
standpoint in most situations.
111 Under the Regulations the amount of time spent in business and non-business
pursuits is an important factor in determining whether a combination business and
personal trip is primarily business or personal in nature. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2) (1958).
112 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958).
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an author and publisher, argued that because an adjudication of incompetency would have been extremely detrimental to the sale of his
books, his legal fees were business expenses incurred to protect his profitable business from destruction. The Government argued that the fees
were personal in nature. The Tax Court characterized the expenses as
personal, on the ground that "the taxpayer's foremost concern [in contesting the incompetency proceedings] was with his personal liberty
rather than the protection or control of his property. .

."113

The court of

appeals, although it agreed with the Tax Court's conclusion, rejected
this approach, observing that the fact "that one taxpayer prizes his
liberty more highly than his property, while another values property
more highly, seems to us irrelevant to the allowance of a claimed deduction.""u 4 It thought that the expenditure should be classified on the
basis of whether "the charge that the taxpayer was incompetent was
. . . directed at destroying his trade or business . . . [or] was directed
at the totality that is the individual.""u 5 Under this test, said the court,
the "taxpayer's motivation is not . . . relevant.""u 0 But the language

used left a possible doubt whether the opinion was laying down a flat
conclusory type of rule (that is, incompetency proceedings are always
personal in nature) or a comparative relatedness rule (that is, the result
in each case is to depend on whether the particular incompetency proceeding was related more to business or to personal affairs). The court
referred to what the particular incompetency charge had been "directed
at." In future cases this wording could be construed as calling for an
examination of all the circumstances leading up to the bringing of the
charge, including the reasons activating the wife or other moving party.
More likely, however, the phrase will be viewed as stating the conclusion that by their very nature charges of incompetency go to the individual as a whole person rather than to him as merely a businessman.
A very recent illustration of the reaction of tax administrators to a
principal purpose test, taken from the realm of administrative regulations rather than of legislation or litigation, concerns an area that we
have already used as an illustration-the deduction of expenses for
education within an undergraduate or graduate degree program. Existing Regulations contain the general rule that expenditures made by
a taxpayer for his education are deductible if the training is undertaken
primarily for the purpose of maintaining or improving skills required
by him in his present employment or other trade or business" 7 _--a
27 T.G. 158 (1956).
114 253 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1958).
"15 Id. at 825.
I's Id. at 826, n.5.
117 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
"13
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position elaborated in a ruling which states that "the fact that . . .a
degree . . . may result does not preclude a deduction .... ,"18 Pro-

posed Regulations, withdrawn in favor of Amended Proposed Regulations, would have denied deductibility if the training-were undertaken
"as part of a program leading to attainment of a recognized level of education"; and they would have specifically included in this non-deductible category any expenditures for education "which of itself, or when
combined with education previously taken (or to be taken) will qualify
the individual for a degree, diploma, or similar certificate ....
What would have been the thrust of this proposed change can be seen
by again considering that old friend, the accountant who pays his way
through a full undergraduate course of study in law school. Instead of
being able to argue for deductibility of his tuition on the ground that
he had enrolled to become a better accountant, he presumably would
have been denied a deduction because he had undertaken a program
0

12
leading to a law degree.

Such an approach must meet one crucial challenge: Is it defensible
to deny deduction of tuition where the accountant's only thought in
attending law school was to become a more skilled accountant and
where in fact he remains in accounting practice throughout his professional life? The result of denying a deduction under these circumstances is that a cost which is incurred exclusively in connection with
an existing trade is never counted as an expense of pursuing that trade.
But that consideration alone should not be conclusive, since we must
recognize that precision in measuring net business income sometimes
comes at too high a price. The decisive question in shaping policy in
these situations should be whether the increase in the crudeness of
measuring income is more than offset by the elimination of such shortcomings in the primary purpose test as heavy administrative costs,
classifications that in the light of hindsight seem to be wrong, and a
118 Rav. RUL. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 69, 71.
119 Proposed Amendments of Regulations, published in the Federal Register on July
7, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 9276 (1966), amending § 1.162-5. This proposed change in the Regulations may have stemmed not from difficulties experienced in administering the principal
purpose test, but rather from a conviction that the basic rule is wrong in failing to recognize that training to advance one's existing career pattern is more in the nature of a
capital expenditure than a business expense.
120 In the entertainment expense area great difficulty was encountered in trying to
distinguish between deductible business entertainment and non-deductible social entertainment on the basis of the taxpayer's reasons for entertaining. Legislative changes in
1962 put the emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the entertainment instead of
on the taxpayer's purpose. See INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 274(a). The Regulations implementing this legislation now provide: "An objective test shall be used to determine
whether an activity is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment." Treas.
Reg. § 1.274-2(b)(ii) (1963).

1967]

Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Taxation

relatively large potential for highhanded or even fraudulent arrangements. To this question, no blanket answer is possible, for we are likely
to balance the scales differently as we move from one tax issue to another.
VI
But will the adoption of a classification by action rule, whether of a
conclusory or of the comparative relatedness type, eliminate all inquiry
into state of mind? If, for example, the proposed (but withdrawn) regulations on the expenses of education had become law, would there no
longer have been any need to consider the state of mind of a practicing
accountant who took undergraduate courses in law school? The answer
may well be that we cannot altogether avoid paying attention to the
thoughts that accompany such actions. Suppose our accountant had
enrolled in law school as a student-at-large and had first taken courses
in taxation, then in trusts and estates, then in corporations, and so on,
until he finally had received a degree in law. How would his tuition
expenses have been handled under the Proposed Regulations? The cost
of the first few eourses, standing alone, seemingly would have been deductible, since they almost certainly could not have been termed either
capital or personal expenditures; moreover, they undoubtedly had
served to maintain or improve skills "required by the individual in his
present employment or other trade or business." But we would have
had to decide whether these first courses were to be viewed as standing
alone or whether they were to be "combined with education ...

to be

taken" later, in which case they might not be deductible. It is this challenge that makes complete escape from state of mind considerations
unlikely and perhaps impossible. Is there any way we can avoid looking
into whether, in the early stages of his law work, the accountant planned
to take only a few courses that had a bearing on accounting work, or
whether he had a preconceived plan to embark on a program leading to
a law degree? And if in those early stages he was undecided, is there any
way we can sidestep the usual ambiguities inherent in a purpose testincluding the question whether principal purpose, a major purpose,
or a significant purpose is to control?
Although under the proposed regulations on education expenses any
residual state of mind ingredient would at most have been a triviality,
in a more generalized version the point illustrated is basic and farreaching. In many areas of tax law-ranging from adjusting ownership
of business interests to reallocating wealth among members of a family
-we face the question whether the various moves in a series of more or
less related actions are to be viewed separately or are to be classified
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only after being consolidated in some fashion. 121 Usually, the tax administrators argue that related steps should be consolidated, -v-hile the
taxpayers insist that they be kept separate. But the positions are not uncommonly reversed. 122 In either event, whenever there is a possibility
of integration, the role to be assigned to a state of mind inquiry may
come into issue. This is seen if, to facilitate analysis, we assume the existence of an explicit rule that in classifying certain types of actions a
determination is first to be made whether each is to stand alone or is to
be consolidated with related actions. What tests can we use to make this
determination, other than an inquiry into the thoughts of the actor, or
of a hypothetical average actor, before and during the time the various
steps were taken? 23 Two major possibilities, both already anticipated,
should be observed.
One is to ignore completely all state of mind considerations and to
ask instead whether from outward appearances the timing and manner
of accomplishing the related actions more-strongly suggest a single program or a disjointed set of moves. 24 This in essence amounts to a version of the comparative relatedness test. In the case of the accountant
121 The integration versus separate steps issue arises in the context of several different
patterns, among which are the following:
1. At the end of a given step, the taxpayer's action ostensibly fits into a certain
classification. Can a later step be treated as part of the action in question to bring about
a different classification?
2. The taxpayer's action ostensibly fit into a certain classification. Can an earlier
step be treated as part of the action in question to bring about a different classification?
.3. A number of separate actions by the taxpayer ostensibly fit into a certain classification. Can these actions be viewed as a single transaction-to change that classification?
4. An action by the taxpayer ostensibly fits into a certain classification. Can this
action be viewed as a set of separate transactions to change that classification?
122 For a recent case in which the taxpayer unsuccessfully sought to have several steps
viewed as a single integrated transaction, see John Town, Inc. 46 T.C. 107 (1966).
23 The Revenue Service will give advance rulings on some issues only where there
are representations that no "concertedylan" is contemplated. In this setting the integraion issue must depend on state of mind. See Rev. Proc. 66-34.-124 Regarding the importance attached to the time interval between steps, it has been
observed in the area of corporate reorganizations: "It is generally agreed that the unity
of steps is not dependent upon how closely they follow one another in time. The temporal
relationship is merely one scrap of objective evidence assisting the courts in applying
whatever other test they deem pertinent. If steps occur within a matter of hours, the
fact that the second step could hardly have been conceived and executed in the interval
following the first is persuasive evidence that they were prearranged, whereas the passage
of a few months or years predisposes a court to find that the later step was a, mere afterthought. On the other hand, where other evidence points to a connected plan and the
delay is adequately explained, the courts-have integrated steps which were as long as
six years apart; and, upon appropriate findings respecting the freedom of action of the
parties, steps taken half an hour apart have been held to be independent." Mintz &
Plumb, Step Transaction in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12th INST. ON FED. TAX

247, 249 (1954).
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enrolled as a student-at-large in law school, for example, we would ask
whether, as of a certain time, his pattern of taking courses more closely
resembled a degree program in law or a form of add-on training for
accountants. To make this comparison, we would need to consider the
usual schooling pattern for getting a law degree on a stretched-out program and that for expanding skills as an accountant. The process would
not be very satisfactory unless some predominant patterns were to
emerge-an unlikely prospect in the area of professional education.
The other possible type of test would focus on the internal relationships among the various steps. The inquiry would delve into whether
it was rational for the taxpayer to take the earlier steps assuming he
did not plan also to take the later ones; 1 25 or, in another version, whether
the moves were interdependent to such a degree that taking the earlier
steps would have been fruitless unless the subsequent steps were also
taken; 126 or, in still another version, whether the steps were so closely
tied together that the taxpayer could not stop short of completing all
of them without suffering inhibiting losses. Thus, in the illustrative
situation we would consider whether, if the taxpayer had stopped short
of fulfilling the requirements for a degree in law, his training up to the
cut-off point would have advanced his career as an accountant. We
would be looking for something like a point of no return-a point after
which the taking of additional law courses does not harmonize with improvement of accounting skills.
What is noteworthy here is that in theory the results under the three
tests in any given situation might not be the same. To illustrate,
assume that the accountant started out as a student-at-large, 'took his
courses on an unevenly spaced and timed pattern, and at the outset
placed in his files a document revealing that he planned on eventually
getting a law degree. 27 Under a state of mind test he would not be al125 In the illustrative case of the accountant attending law school, this issue might
be phrased in terms of how likely it was that the taxpayer anticipated taking additional
courses.
126 The court in ACF-Brill Motors Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 704, 707 (3d Cir.
1951), put the test this way: "Were the steps so interdependent that the relations created
by one transaction would have been fruitless without the completion of the series?"
Where a transaction involved commitments between two or more parties, this test
might be framed in a more colloquial way: If the whole deal had fallen through, would
the taxpayer have been able to ignore or undo-the early step without subjecting himself
to liability? See Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions,in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDrnAL TAXATION
200 (2d ser. 1938).
127 As another illustration, consider the case of an individual who transfers appredated property to a corporation in exchange for all its stock and who immediately afterwards, in accordance with a previously formed plan, makes a gift of more than twenty
per cent of that stock to relatives. The appreciation will be taxed at the time of transfer
to the corporation if it is determined that the transferor had an 80% controlling in-
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lowed to deduct any part of his tuition fees; under a comparative relatedness or resemblance test he might be able to sustain a deduction
for all of them; and under an interrelatedness test he probably could
deduct for his early courses in taxation and trusts, but not for his later
128
studies in trial techniques and evidence.
In practice, however, we usually do not differentiate among the tests
so sharply, nor do we employ any single approach to the problem for
use across the board.12 The myriad of classification rules are designed
to serve highly divergent policies; and no one of the three types of tests
for handling the integration-separate steps issue is likely to best implement all the different policies. 130 If any other generalization can be
supported, it is the not surprising point that we tend to rely heavily
on outward appearances where the steps seem to be closely interlocked,
terest in the corporation at that time. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351. If the transfer of
property and the gift of shares are treated as being linked together, the transferor will
not be said to have had the requisite control, and the transfer to the corporation will
be taxable. The two steps might well be integrated if the test turned on the plan of
the transferor; they would not be integrated if the test were either the independent
significance of the first step or the freedom of the transferor not to take the second
step after completion of the first. See Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514
(2d Cir. 1942), adopting the last mentioned test.
128 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 265(2), provides that no deduction shall be allowed for
"interest on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations . . .
the interest on which is wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle." There
is no indication on the face of this section whether the taxpayer's thoughts in incurring
or continuing the indebtedness are relevant. Suppose that on the first day of a month
the taxpayer borrowed a sum of money, putting up his home as security, and that on
the last day of that month he purchased the same amount of exempt bonds. Would
these facts alone result in denial of a deduction for interest paid the bank, or would
denial result only if the two actions (borrowing on the home and purchasing the bonds)
were linked in the taxpayer's thoughts?
129 In consolidating various steps, courts often speak of the "essential nature of the
transaction" without specifying the test used for ascertaining this essential nature. An
illustration is provided by the opinion in Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining
Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938), dealing with the question whether a purchase of
stock, followed by a liquidation of the acquired corporation a year later, amounted to a
purchase of the acquired corporation's assets: "The question remains, however, whether
if the entire transaction, whatever its form, was essentially in intent, purpose and result,
a purchase ... of property, its several steps may be treated separately and each be given
an effect for tax purposes as though each constituted a distinct transaction. . . . And
without regard to whether the result is imposition or relief from taxation, the courts
have recognized that where the essential nature of a transaction is the acquisition of
property, it will be viewed as a whole, and closely related steps will not be separated
"
either at the instance of the taxpayer or the taxing authority ....
130 Two perceptive commentators have written that "the aphorisms about 'closely
related steps' and 'integrated transactions' may have different meanings in different contexts, and that there may not be one rule but several, depending on the substantive
provisions of the Code to which they are being applied." Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx 247, 252-53 (1954).
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yet we generally take account of the actor's thoughts where it is asserted
that they provide a different, less obvious explanation for the pattern of
conduct. Consider, for example, a transfer of property to a corporation
by its controlling shareholders. Under the statute, if the transfer is a
contribution of capital, the corporation succeeds to the tax basis which
the assets had in the hands of the shareholders; if the transfer is a sale
at fair market value, the corporation takes the sale price as its basis.
Suppose that controlling shareholders contribute money to a corporation, and soon afterwards the corporation buys property from the shareholders at a price equal to the property's fair market value and equal
to the shareholders' cash contribution. Inasmuch as this is an area in
which separate steps are to be consolidated whenever appropriate, the
question arises whether the property transfer is to be treated separately
as a purchase for cash, or is to be viewed in combination with the cash
contribution and therefore as a contribution of property.
In this type of situation, the actions appear to speak for themselves.
The close timing of the two steps and the equivalence between the
amount of cash contributed and the purchase price seem to preclude
separating the two actions; moreover, there seems to be no difficulty in
describing the beginning and end of the transaction viewed as a single
whole. But, even though in the usual case the result is almost certain to
be the same whether or not the thoughts of the shareholders are considered, in the rare case a difference may be expected. Suppose, for example, that the shareholders in fact planned for the corporation to use
the contributed cash to purchase other property from outsiders, and
immediately afterwards for a good and demonstrable reason they
changed their minds. At least in these odd cases, we are reluctant to
ignore state of mind and rely exclusively on the appearance of things.
This is probably nothing more than another instance of the by now
familiar observation that where a rule calls for ascertaining state of
mind, we are unlikely to be moved by self-serving statements about
mental operations which seem to be refuted by external factors unless
the inconsistencies can be satisfactorily explained away.
A distinction should be noted between two aspects of the problem
of separate steps versus integration, one being illustrated by the transfer
to the controlled corporation and the other by the accountant who enrolled in law school as a student-at-large. Ordinarily, a person cannot
use a student-at-large status to accomplish the same non-tax ends that
he can satisfy by being a degree candidate. A person can, however, often
serve the same non-tax ends either by transferring property to a controlled corporation, or by transferring cash and having the corporation
use the cash to buy the property from the transferor. In situations of the
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latter variety, the separate steps versus integration issue can be restated
as asking whether the form of the transaction is to prevail over the substance. Whenever it is so framed, the question may be regarded as a
branch of the more general anti-tax avoidance doctrines discussed previously. By going through a series of related actions as though each
were separate, taxpayers may seek only to minimize taxes, or they may
seek to accomplish some non-tax objective. 131 An anti-tax avoidance
principle, in essence, calls for a judgment whether any sufficiently
weighty and relevant non-tax objective was served or plausibly could
have been served by the action under scrutiny. Such an approach can
also be employed in deciding whether a series of actions is to be subjected to a test for consolidation. Under that approach, the actions always would be treated as separate, even though they were part of a plan,
if there had been a good enough business or other acceptable non-tax
goal to be served by the course taken; and in the absence of such a goal,
the applicable test would be brought to bear in deciding whether under
the facts of the particular case a consolidation of the steps was in order.
But we should again note that, although it may be readily stated in terms
of motive and purpose, such an anti-tax avoidance principle is likely
131 Omitted from the text is any mention of such terms as "sham," "mere artifice,"
etc. These reprobative labels, which seldom aid in analysis, are used in various ways.
They are sometimes used to characterize actions that are different from what they purport
to be because of secret agreements or false documents. They are also used to describe contrived actions which do not deviate from their outward appearances, but which cannot
have any consequences other than the attainment of otherwise unavailable tax advantages.
One might question whether there is any difference between such "sham" actions and
other actions that have tax reduction goals but no non-tax objectives. A recent attempt
to distinguish the two was made in Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 742 (1966):
"In many instances transactions that lack all substance, utility, and purpose, and which
can only be explained on the ground that taxpayer sought an interest deduction in order
to reduce his taxes, will also be so transparently arranged that they can candidly be
labeled 'shams.' In those instances . . . the rationale of the decision we announce today
[that the borrowing must serve a purpose other than reducing taxes] . . . [is] available
as grounds for disallowing the deduction. The present case makes plain, however, that
these rationales are distinct from each other, and that a court need not always first label
a loan transaction a 'sham' in order to deny a deduction for interest paid in connection
with the loan."
In dealing with the integration versus separate steps problem, a distinction is sometimes made on the basis of whether each step had "substance," or whether some of the
steps amounted to mere paper shuffling that lacked "substance." Thus, in Chamberlin
v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1953), the court noted: "The facts in
this case show tax avoidance, and it is so conceded by petitioner. But they also show a
series of legal transactions, no one of which is fictitious or so lacking in substance as to
be anything different from what it purports to be. Unless we are to adopt the broad
policy of holding taxable any series of transactions, the purpose and result of which is
the avoidance of taxes which would otherwise accrue if handled in a different way, regardless of the legality and realities of the component parts, the tax assessed by the
Commissioner was successfully avoided in the present case."
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in operation to play down state of mind considerations and to build
mainly on external factors that indicate the significance of non-tax goals.
We have been assuming situations in which the law calls for determining whether several steps are to be viewed as independent or are to
be integrated. In some areas, however, the law in classifying actions does
not require consolidation of interrelated steps even though they were
taken separately solely in order to reduce taxes. 1 32 Form is deliberately
permitted to control, so that the result will turn on the tax consequences
of each step rather than on those of the whole operation. To illustrate,
suppose a taxpayer owning stock that has increased in value sells his
shares through a broker and simultaneously buys through the broker
the identical number and class of shares in the same corporation. Rather
than combine the sale and purchase steps so as to treat the shareholder
as having retained his original shares, we tax his gain and regard him
as having entered into a wholly new transaction-even if he admits
that he planned not to alter his investment position and that he wanted
only to realize a gain in order to offset a loss already sustained during
the year. 133 Where form is thus automatically accepted, there is no occasion for an inquiry into motive or purpose. But in most areas of taxation form is not treated as decisive, and hence we need to ask how one
can pick out the rules under which form is always to govern.
A short answer is that there can be no universal guide to identifying
the rules under which form is to control. Resolution of each form
versus substance issue requires consideration of the policy or policies to
be served by the particular part of the law which is in question; and in
searching for guidelines, the values of adhering to form may themselves
be regarded as a matter of policy.1 34 We frequently speak of this process
as looking for the intent of the legislature. Such a perspective may or
132 Consider, for example, a corporation that owns an 80% controlling interest
in a subsidiary and has a loss on its investment in the subsidiary shares. Shareholder
losses in liquidation of controlled subsidiaries are not recognized at the time of liquidation. In Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (lst Cir. 1956), the parent, in
order to have its loss on liquidation of the subsidiary recognized, sold immediately before liquidation enough of its shareholdings in the subsidiary to get below the 80%
controlling interest line. The strategem was allowed to stand.
133 "Wash" losses are not allowed. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1091. There is no counterpart provision in the case of "wash" gains.
134 A good illustration is furnished by the incorporation of a business. The owner is
entitled to all the tax advantages of incorporation even though he incorporated only to
get those advantages.
With respect to the question whether corporate form is to be disregarded, the Supreme
Court has said that "so long as [the] purpose [in using a corporation] is the equivalent
of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the
corporation remains a separate taxable entity." Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,
319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
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may not be helpful. But what merits note here is that this sifting for
policy cannot be advanced by looking to the motive, intent, or purpose
of any or all of the participants in a particular transaction whose tax
consequences are in doubt.
VII
We come at last to the perplexing question of what constitutes the
outer limits of meaningful state of mind inquiries in taxation. There
are rules that seem to deal with motive or intent, but do so in oblique
ways. These rules provide an opportunity to speculate about the possible boundaries of useful state of mind probes.
An inviting area for exploration involves the question, frequently
encountered in connection with closely held corporations, of when instruments or contracts which in form reflect a corporate indebtedness
are to be treated as investments in the equity. 13 5 One obvious role here
for a state of mind inquiry should be mentioned and then put aside.
If those who own and control the corporation have an undisclosed understanding that they will ignore the terms of the ostensible debtorcreditor relationship, their secret plan is to be taken into account in
classifying the pieces of paper. "It is always open to the Commissioner
to prove that the transaction is not what it appears, [but] ... that the
parties truly intended to and actually did enter into another and hidden
136
agreement by which their rights are to be governed."'
Several other state of mind inquiries for resolving the debt-equity
question are suggested by examining the various opinions in the Gilbert litigation. The Tax Court initially found that one of the investors
135 Another problem which tests the usefulness of the state of mind factor is whether a
family partnership is to be recognized in ascertaining the proper taxable persons. The
Supreme Court has taken the position that tax recognition of partners in a family partnership formed by gifts of capital depends upon whether the partnership was formed "in
good faith .
with a business purpose." Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742
(1949). The Regulations that implement § 704(e) of the Code, which was designed to
provide objective guidelines for determining the allocation of income in the case of
family partnerships, list the intent of the parties as one of the factors to be considered
in determining whether there was a complete transfer of capital to the donee-partner.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(3)(i)(b) (1956) This formulation is not clear. If the point is that
we are to look behind the formal documents to take account of any hidden understandings that vary the terms, it is of course correct. But there seems little justification for
insisting that a gift of an interest in a partnership to a close relative must have been
accompanied by a business purpose before the income derived from the capital element
in the transferred interest will be taxed to the donee. See Henry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382
(1958).
136 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957). In Gooding Amusement
Co., 23 T.C. 408, 418-19 (1954), the Tax Court put emphasis on whether "the noteholders
intend to enforce payment of their notes or assert the rights of bona fide creditors." This
approach led the court to consider "the real intention of the parties."
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"had an intention, although it was vague and not based on valid reasoning, that her advances to [the corporation] should be loans and this intention was acquiesced in by the corporation .... "137 It might have
been relevant to consider what rights the investors intended to create
among themselves and with respect to other parties by having the corporation purport to contract an indebtedness. But, as was earlier noted
in looking at the definition of gifts that are excludable from income, it
is unsound for a court to resolve such an issue by ascertaining what
classification was sought by the taxpayer, since the very question in dispute is whether the facts in the case are to be treated as coming within
that classification. 138 Moreover, as the court of appeals pointed out the
first time it reviewed the Gilbert litigation, there is error in the view
137 Benjamin D. Gilbert, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 688, 694 (1956).

Earlier in the development of the distinction between debt and equity in the tax field,
courts paid considerable attention to whether the parties intended to create a debt. In
Alma de Bretteville Spreckels, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1113, 1117 (1949), for example, the
court said: "These circumstances relied upon by respondent are not sufficient to constitute
[sic] the advances a contribution to capital if the real intention of the parties was that
the advances should constitute loans, for the intention is the controlling factor, and where
the bona fides is not questioned (as here), the facts that the lender was the sole stockholder
and the corporation's business was not prospering are not a basis for disregarding the true
intention or the right of the parties to create debts."
In American-La France-Foamite Corp. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 723, 724 (2d Cir. 1960),
the court, in discussing the distinction between loans and capital contributions, observed:
"[I]t is said that 'the intention of the parties is a major factor in determining the relationship' (Jennings v. United States, 7 Cir., 1959, 272 F.2d 842, 843). However, 'intention'
is often a highly artificial and hypothetical concept because most frequently business
ventures originate and are carried on without any ciear intent as to tax consequences.
If the venture is directed from the start by tax counsel and accountants, it is likely
that the advances will be definitely recognizable as loans or capital contributions ...
In final analysis, it is from [the] composite of all the facts that an attempt must be made
to create a probably non-existent intent and to decide in relation to accepted business
practices whether the 'loan' pan of the scale is heavier than the 'capital contribution'
pan."
138 In deciding whether a note represents a bona fide indebtedness in an intra-family
situation, tax law generally has followed the legal relationships recognized under applicable private law. Thus, the Tax Court has said: "It must be dearly shown that it was
the intention of the parties to create a debtor-creditor status . . . that there existed at
the time of the transaction a real expectation of repayment and intent to enforce the
collection of the indebtedness." Estate of Van Anda, 12 T.C. 1158, 1162 (1949). A few
courts have uncritically used comparable language in deciding whether a security having
the formal trappings of debt is to be treated as an indebtedness that can sustain an
interest deduction. See Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1956),
in which the court said: "The parties were competent to contract a debt; if it was
their 'purpose' or 'intent' to do so, then they succeeded because they performed consciously and purposely the legal acts that establish a debt."
There are situations, however, in which we apparently accept the characterization
placed on a transaction by the participating parties because we believe that the rules
are designed to permit the parties to apportion their taxes among themselves. See David A.
Foxman, 41 T.C. 535 (1964), dealing with the withdrawal of a partner from a partnership.
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that "all inquiry ends upon a finding that the obligation actually
created will be treated as debt for non-tax purposes . . . ."13 This
parallels the point that a transfer is not necessarily a gift under the income tax merely because it is a gift under the private law that governs
relationships arising out of the transfer.
More instructive was the view of the court of appeals that the distinction between debt and equity rests on a difference in risks, and that
"the shareholder's understanding of the degree of risk involved is of
course relevant in determining what is in fact the degree of risk involved. '140 In making the risk analysis, according to the court, "the
motives and expectations of the taxpayer are relevant [but] only insofar
as they contribute to an understanding of the external facts of the
situation."'"1 Here, our own assessment of risk is demanded, and inquiry into the state of mind of the participants is useful only insofar
as it sharpens our perception of the external facts. Viewed in this light,
the motives or purposes of the owners obviously have no direct bearing
on the classification issue.
A dissenting opinion, however, argued that the distinction between
debt and equity should turn on a different question: "When the
[parties] ... decided to make their advances in the form of debts, rather
than of capital advances, did they suppose that the difference would
appreciably affect their beneficial interests in the venture, other than
taxwise?"' 42 Such a test appears to rest on the participant's state of mind;
specifically, on whether he thought that making an investment in debt
as opposed to equity form would have appreciable non-tax consequences. It is at this line that the meaningfulness of a state of mind
standard is open to challenge. The suggested test does not seem to refer
to motive, intent, or purpose in any of the classical senses of the terms
noted at the outset; that is, it does not appear to inquire into what
legal relationships the individual desired to create, or what he hoped
to accomplish, or why he acted as he did in taking debt paper instead
of making a clear-cut contribution of equity capital. Rather, the test
seems to focus on the taxpayer's level of understanding of business
affairs and legal relationships outside the tax field, such as the rights
of the parties in voluntary liquidations and bankruptcy proceedings.
As a criterion for taxation, this standard would run into special
difficulties. Not only would it tend to penalize the unworldly; but, once
announced, it would lead the sophisticated to inform themselves on the
248 F.2d 399, 408 (1957).
Id. at 407.
141 Id. at 407.
142 Id. at 412.
139
140
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ways in which their arrangements could make differences apart from
taxation. Surely, there is little sense in having tax results turn on
whether a person put himself in a position to say, truthfully, that his
advisors had told him that his arrangements really did entail certain
enumerated non-tax consequences.
If the tax consequences of arrangements are to depend on non-tax
factors, the preferable course is to ignore the understanding of the
participants-other than perhaps as an aid to our own comprehension
of the non-tax factors-and to weigh the significance of those factors
143
independently of the participants' thoughts on the subject.
There is a further question here: Can the debt-equity classification
scheme ignore motive, intent, and purpose, and instead refer only to
the expectations of the actors? Specifically, might the difinition of debt
be made to turn on whether the investors originally thought that the
corporation would be able to pay interest charges and repay the
144
advances within the times specified in the instruments?
Difficulties with this criterion soon become apparent if, as is quite
likely, not all of the investors shared the same expectations. In connection with taxation of the investors, for example, the test could lead us
to regard a round of pay-outs by the corporation as constituting for
some investors a return of loaned capital and for others who invested
under similar circumstances a distribution of a dividend. There is
something amiss in differentiating among investors who admittedly are
in the same boat merely because their personality traits are not the
same. Why should an optimist be entitled to recover his investment
fully before being taxed, while a pessimist is forced to regard his
receipts as dividends even though he has not recovered any of his
143 An oddity in the debt-equity cases is that the reclassification issue is more likely
to arise if the business is a failure than if it is a success. Possibly the best way for a shareholder-creditor to demonstrate that his expectations as to repayment of the debt were
realistic is to cause the corporation to succeed.
Note that resolution of the debt versus equity problem is not helped by asking whether
the creation of the ostensible debt served a business purpose. See Toledo Blade Co., 11
T.C. 1079 (1948).
144 It is instructive to compare treatment of the debt versus equity issue with treatment of the question whether an advance by a corporation to a shareholder is to be
regarded as a loan (not taxable to the shareholder) or as a dividend (taxable on receipt
if covered by corporate earnings and profits). In resolving the latter issue, the key question usually is whether it was the intention of the recipient and of those in control
of the corporation to create a debtor-creditor relationship; that is, whether there was
an intent on the part of the recipient to pay back the withdrawal and an intent on the
part of those in control of the corporation to enforce the obligation. But the question
is to be resolved by considering "whether or not the parties demonstrated by their actions
that a loan was intended in good faith, rather than a dividend." Toll, Constructive
Dividends, 1951 U. So. CAL. TAX INsT. 211, 229.
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investment? In connection with taxation of the corporation, the expectations standard is even less satisfactory. Under it we would have to
agree on whose expectations are germane in deciding, for example,
whether a round of pay-outs amounts to a deductible payment of
interest or a non-deductible distribution of a dividend. Fragmenting
this issue, so as to classify each pay-out to each recipient separately for
determining the tax position of the company, would be impractical;
and it would be equally unreasonable to call upon the corporation, in
computing its own taxes, to ascertain the expectation that predominated among all the investors. The whole operation becomes even
more unmanageable, and less justifiable, where some of the original
investors sell or give their investment position to others not previously
associated with the corporation.
These shortcomings might argue for conducting our inquiry into
expectations through examining the thoughts of that old standby, the
hypothetical typical taxpayer. The trouble with doing so here is that
a search for the reasonable man's expectations would be apt to involve
nothing more than an assessment of the business risks attending the
investment. Once it was found that there had or had not been a sufficient likelihood that the so-called interest and principal obligations
would be met on schedule by the corporation, the issue would seemingly be settled. We thus would be using the reasonable man standard
not to assess expectations, but rather to assess business risks-an external factor with no state of mind overtones. 145
Suppose, however, that, despite all the drawbacks, we were to adopt
a rule that separated equity from debt by referring to the expectations
of the actual investors. Could it then be plausibly said that an inquiry
into expectations was merely an aspect of an inquiry into purpose?
Such a conclusion might be suggested by our application of the statutory rules stating that operating losses are deductible in ventures carried on for profit but not in ones carried on for personal satisfactions. 146
Hobby activities not infrequently both produce revenue and provide
their owners with personal enjoyment. Our main test in these situations
is of the primary purpose variety: We ask whether the taxpayer's primary reason (motive, intent, or purpose) in conducting the operation
was to make a profit or to gratify his personal desires. This question145 One commentator puts the debt versus equity matter this way: "mhe essence
of the problem in each case [is] whether or not the parties could and did realistically
expect that cash would be generated from which the loan could be repaid in accordance
with its terms." Hickman, The Thin Corporation:Another Look at an Old Disease, 44
TAxrs 883, 891 (1966). This does not tell us whether the result should be different where
the parties "could" have had such an expectation but in fact "did not."
146 INT. Ra.
CODE oF 1954, §§ 165(c), 262.
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why the actor did what he did-is like other primary purpose or motive
questions that were examined earlier. What stands out in these hobby
situations is that frequently we pay a great deal of explicit attention to
expectations. A key question often is: Did the taxpayer expect that the
enterprise as conducted would earn a profit? 147 The answer, though not
conclusive, is taken to bear strongly on the taxpayer's primary reason
for investing in his hobby.
This relationship between expectations on the one hand and motive,
intent, or purpose on the other is, however, of no help in distinguishing
between debt and equity investments in closely held corporations. In
the nature of things, the investors' expectations regarding the corporation's ability to fulfill its interest and principal obligations cannot provide any sound leads as to the investors' reasons for causing the corporation to go through the motions of taking on an indebtedness rather
than accepting contributions of equity capital. For the fact is that the
investors' reasons for preferring a debt position to an equity interest
were probably not affected by their expectations, if any, about the corporation's capacity to meet a stated schedule for returning the advances.
More likely, the investors had their eyes on the tax advantages of debt
48
as compared to equity investments
147 It is said that the expectation of profit need not be a reasonable expectation when
viewed objectively. "The proper test is not the reasonableness of the taxpayer's belief
that a profit will be realized, but whether it is entered into and carried on in good faith
and for the purpose of making a profit, or in the belief that a profit can be realized
thereon, and that it is not conducted merely for pleasure, exhibition, or social diversion."
Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1933). However, external factors usually
are assigned a predominant role in ascertaining the taxpayer's expectations. Thus, in
Henry P. White, 23 T.C. 90, 94 (1954), dealing with a wealthy man who operated a ballistics
laboratory at a cost to income ratio of about 12 to I over a 17-year period, the court
found that there was no profit motive, observing that "anyone of his intelligence, education, and ability, with knowledge of the facts, could not in good faith reasonably have
expected or intended to operate his ballistics laboratory profitably."
%Vill the taxpayer's assertion of profit seeking ever be accepted in the face of a
glaring record of losses or of unbusinesslike conduct? In an unusual case a court of
appeals concluded that the tryer of fact had been wrong in concluding that the taxpayers, Texans in the oil business (and "men of sound business judgment"), could not
have engaged in a horse breeding venture with any expectation of profit: "The breeding
of horses would not be considered merely a fad in Texas. It is not at all unprobable that
men in the oil business, having ample capital, would engage in the enterprises here
involved with the hope and expectation of ultimately making a fair return on the
investment." Farish v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1939).
Compare United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963), involving the question
whether the expectations of the taxpayer or of ordinary prudent persons dealing in
mineral lands or mineral leases are relevant in deciding whether a certain receipt is an
.,oil payment" or a "royalty."
148 Purpose or intent proved not to be useful for distinguishing between employee
stock options that were intended as compensation and those that were intended to give
the executive a proprietary interest in the corporation. Since any stock option has strong

542

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:485

In the end, a rather simple point emerges. If we are to distinguish
between debt and equity in the hands of the owners of closely held corporations, the only realistic standard is one that turns on the degree of
risk attending the investment. Such a standard calls for determining
whether the investment is more like an equity risk or a creditor riska test of the comparative relatedness type. The expectations of the actual
investors regarding corporate earnings and pay-outs may assist in evaluating the riskiness of the investments. But these expectations are not
likely to tell us anything about the investors' reasons for putting the
investment in debt form; in any event, those reasons should have little
bearing on the classification of the investment under the tax law. 149
compensatory aspects, it is unrealistic to pin a large tax difference on the corporation's
"reason" for granting the option. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
In the case of a gift of shares to a family corporation, can an inquiry into the transferor's state of mind be used to draw a distinction between a gift to the corporation and
a gift to the other shareholders? In Estate of Hitchon, 45 T.C. 96, 104 (1965), a concurring
judge said: "Once it is determined that a gift was intended, I would hold that such a
transfer by a stockholder to a corporation is a gift to the other stockholders [followed
I do not agree that
by a pro rata contribution to capital by all the stockholders] ....
there is a difference, in these circumstances, between a transfer by a stockholder to a
corporation of its own shares and a transfer of other property, allegedly based on the
theory that in the former case there is a proportionate increase in the interests of the
other stockholders while the latter case involves merely an increase in the value of the
stockholders' existing interests." A dissenting opinion argued that the transfer was not a
gift to the other shareholders because "no gifts to [them] ... were intended." Id. at 105.
Suppose that Mr. A, the sole or dominant stockholder of a corporation, surreptitiously
takes funds out of his corporation. Is this a dividend, or is it something else? "The
pivotal question is whether the $100,000 taken by Mr. A represents a distribution in
Whether the money was a distribution or not is
respect of his X corporation stock ....
determined in part by the intent of the X corporation . . . . The question when
applied to the cases that develop in this area is meaningless. Neither Mr. A, nor his
counterparts in the litigated cases were thinking of the formal and mechanical words of
the Internal Revenue Code when they took their corporate funds. They owned all of the
corporate stock; they were in complete control of their respective corporations, and they
took the money." Gardner, The Tax Consequences of Shareholder Diversions in Close
Corporations,21 TAx L. REv. 223, 238 (1966).
149 Consider the problem of deciding whether an arrangement purporting to be a
lease of equipment is to be recognized by the tax law as a lease or is to be treated as a
conditional sale. One important indicium of a conditional sale is the development by
the user of an equity in the asset, and such a development depends in part on the value
of the property. The expectations of the parties, at the time of consummating the
arrangement, with respect to changes in the value of the asset may therefore be relevant
in assessing whether the arrangement was calculated to develop an equity for the user.
See Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959); Benton v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 39; Note,
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Equipment Lease-or-Purchase Agreements, 52 VA.
L. R.v. 1336 (1966).
It might be more instructive to ask whether the parties intended the user to develop
an equity in the asset than to ask whether the parties intended to enter into a sale rather
than a lease.
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VIII

A rational tax system needs to consider why motive, intent, and purpose are relevant to accomplishing its aims. As we put our federal income tax to this challenge, some of the points made in this piece may
be seen in a slightly different perspective.
The federal tax, as a practical matter, generally has to utilize state
law concepts and relationships when doing so is compatible with income
tax policies. When the borrowed principles involve references to motive, intent, or purpose, these notions automatically find their way into
tax law.
Any net income tax must distinguish between consumption and the
expenses of producing income. A leading scholar on income taxation
pointed out long ago that "here one finds inescapable the unwelcome
criterion of intention. A thoroughly precise and objective distinction
is inconceivable. Given items will represent business expense in one
instance and merely consumption in another .

. .

. In another in-

stance, moreover, the same items may represent investment in training
for earning activity later on."' 50 Nevertheless, in making the distinctions between consumption, expense and investment we have a choice
among rules ranging from those that stress state of mind considerations
to those that rely heavily, if not exclusively, on external factors.
A refined income tax need not subject various receipts to differential
rates of tax. It may, however, choose to do so. If differentiations are
based on the reason (or reasons) why a transferor gave something of
value to the taxpayer, or why a taxpayer held an asset on which he experienced a gain or loss, the classification cannot avoid inquiring into
state of mind.
Finally, in some areas, particularly those relating to the treatment of
artificial entities and their owners, it may be expedient to adopt tax
rules that turn on matters of form. These rules often can most easily
be drafted against a background of "normal" ways of doing things; but,
as two well-known tax experts have pointed out, "the very breadth of the
transactions to which the rules could extend and the mechanical terms
in which they are written combine to make [the advantageous forms]
a tempting avenue of tax avoidance to persons who were not intended to be the recipients of such a safe-conduct pass."'' We may
therefore wish to deny tax advantages where use of particular forms
serves no adequate non-tax goals. While purpose is central in distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable uses of forms, purpose
150 SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 54 (1938).
151 SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1530 (integrated ed. 1960).
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here generally can be equated with function. Thus, it is possible largely
to ignore state of mind considerations and to rely almost entirely on
external factors.
But while there is a difference between tests based on states of mind
and tests based on external factors, we have seen that results under the
two types of tests are generally not very far apart. Whenever state of
mind is relevant, the most important operational question usually concerns the weight that is to be attached to various external factors. And
for this reason it is in close or extraordinary cases that state of mind
is likely to play a significant role as a standard for decision.

